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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab 
Spring that erupted in early 2011 in several Arab countries, and how Saudi Arabia dealt 
with these events. The reactions of Saudi Arabia towards the events of the Arab Spring 
seem contradictory in the sense of effectively supporting the regimes in Bahrain and 
Egypt whilst supporting the opposition in Libya and Syria. Several research questions are 
raised in this thesis, therefore this study attempts to provide answers on how a 
conservative status quo like the Kingdom serves its objectives in a revolutionary 
environment, and why Saudi Arabia applies these apparent contradictory measures in 
dealing with the Arab Spring. This study uses Neoclassical Realist approach to study the 
foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring, and how Saudi Arabia 
dealt with the threats unleashed by the Arab Spring. Lastly, the conclusion of this thesis 
tests the hypotheses and offers a comprehensive understating of the Saudi reaction 
towards the Arab Spring from a Neoclassical Realist perspective. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
Introduction 
 
The thesis “The Saudi reaction to the Arab Revolts: The Paradoxical Saudi Policy 
towards the Arab Spring” aims at studying how the Saudi foreign policy dealt with Arab 
Spring and why the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reacted differently to these events. The 
Kingdom developed diverse responses to the events of the Arab Spring in countries like 
Egypt and Bahrain in one hand and in Syria and Libya on the other hand, where Saudi 
reactions towards the countries that experienced mass protests seems contradictory. In 
some cases, Saudi Arabia supported incumbent regimes against public demands of 
change; while in other cases it took the side of the opposition against the ruling regime. 
The Saudi reactions towards the Arab Spring included a broad range of policies from 
active military defense of the incumbent regime in Bahrain to the active support of the 
anti-regime forces and the opposition in Syria. Explaining these seeming contradictions is 
the subject matter of this thesis with the aim to provide an integrated interpretation of the 
foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. 
Variant Saudi policies raise questions about the objectives of Saudi Arabia in the region 
and how Saudi Arabia pursues these objectives in such a revolutionary environment. In 
order to understand these dissimilarities, the threats that Saudi Arabia faces as a result of 
the Arab Spring must be analyzed, and the capabilities and resources that Saudi Arabia 
mobilized to formulate its foreign policy have to be examined and assessed. 
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The Research Problem 
Since early 2011, Saudi Arabia has been confronted with increasing challenges as a result 
of the Arab Spring, which has dramatically changed the political composition and the 
balance of power in the region as many autocratic regimes were deposed in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Internally, Saudi Arabia have remained largely free of 
significant trouble,
1
 when compared to other countries in the region where the waves of 
the Arab Spring toppled ruling regimes, caused civil strife or achieved considerable 
successes of democratic progress. The Saudi reaction towards domestic dissent resulting 
from the Arab Spring within the Kingdom, in addition to its stance towards the events of 
the Arab Spring in other countries seems contradictory. As Saudi Arabia has suppressed 
and resisted revolts arising from the Arab Spring within the Kingdom and in other 
friendly countries like Egypt and Bahrain, while it was in favor of supporting the 
opposition in countries like Syria and Libya. Domestically, Saudi Arabia was affected by 
these developments, on a low scale though, where it had to address possible popular 
discontent through a combination of limited reforms, massive economic distribution, and 
the use of regular repressive measures. The ruling regime in Saudi Arabia, like most 
authoritarian rentier Arab regimes, maintains power through repression of opposition on 
one hand, while offering security and economic prosperity to its citizens on the other 
hand. The spill-over effects of the Arab Spring made its way to Saudi Arabia in the early 
months of 2011. Calls for protests were made through social network platforms such as 
the Facebook page known as “A Saudi Day of Rage”, which had around 36,000 
                                                          
1
 Simon Mabon, "Kingdom in Crisis? The Arab Spring and Instability in Saudi Arabia."Contemporary 
Security Policy, 2012, 530. 
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members, and minor protests were organized in Riyadh, Eastern Province and other Saudi 
cities.
2
 In response, Saudi King Abdullah has offered billions of dollars to discourage 
dissent among the Saudi citizens, with the aim that this policy would preserve the status 
quo, protect the stability and security of the Al Saud’s regime. The policy that Saudi 
Arabia is using internally is simple yet it has proved effective; where the power is 
consolidated in the hands of the ruling family, while the Saudi citizens enjoy ample 
economic dividends, limited political rights, and have little influence on the decision 
making process within a constrained political sphere.
3
 The politics of state patronage and 
rentierism are mainly based on the redistribution of oil wealth, which is one of the Saudi 
regime’s main effective instruments to contain potential dissent. Such policy has helped 
the Saudi regime to enhance its legitimacy, which is also derived from many other 
internal and external aspects such as religious significance and Western support. 
Externally, Saudi Arabia responded to the Arab Spring with some sort of contradictory 
standards. Saudi Arabia actively intervened in support of the opposition, especially in 
Syria, and facilitated an Arab League’s resolution to impose a no-fly zone in Libya which 
eventually led to the fall of the Qaddafi’s regime. On contrast, Saudi Arabia intervened 
militarily in Bahrain in support for the ruling regime against protesters demanding 
political reform. As for the Egyptian revolution of 2011, Saudi Arabia avoided taking an 
explicit strong position against the Egyptian revolution. Nevertheless, there is strong 
evidence that Saudi Arabia was on the regime’s side to the extent that the ouster of the 
former president Hosni Mubarak has caused a political strife in the relationship between 
                                                          
2
 Ibid, 532. 
3
 Toby Craig Jones, "Saudi Arabia Versus the Arab Spring." Raritan: A Quarterly Review 31, no. 2, 45. 
http://raritanquarterly.rutgers.edu/files/article-pdfs/toby-jones-raritan-fall-2011.pdf. 
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Saudi Arabia and the United States, as the Kingdom thought that the United States 
“should have done more to bolster Mubarak’s regime”.4 Later in 2013, Saudi Arabia 
explicitly supported the protests that led to the removal of the elected Muslim 
Brotherhood former Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi from power. In addition, Saudi 
Arabia strongly supported the military-backed regime that came to power following the 
removal of Mohamed Morsi’s regime. As for the developments in Tunisia, Oman, Jordan 
and Morocco, Saudi Arabia was on the regime's side, but only through less intense 
measures. Receiving the fleeing former president of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in 
Saudi Arabia was a sign of the sympathy which the government of Saudi Arabia had 
towards the deposed president. These contradictory responses to the developments of the 
Arab Spring raise questions about the objectives of Saudi Arabia, and why it reacted in 
such contradictory manner in countries that similarly experienced mass revolts. 
The goal here is to address the broad question about the strategies through which a 
conservative status quo power like Saudi Arabia served its objectives in such a 
revolutionary environment. In order to understand how Saudi Arabia served its objectives 
in the revolutionary environment, it is essential to analyze the threats unleashed by the 
Arab Spring and the capabilities that Saudi Arabia had at its disposal and its ability to 
mobilize these capabilities and resources to deal with these perceived threats. The nature 
of the responses of Saudi Arabia to these events could be examined through taking into 
considerations the objectives and interests of Saudi Arabia, particularly regime survival, 
                                                          
4
 Martin Chulov, "Is America's Relationship with Saudi Arabia Broken beyond Repair?" The Guardian, 
March 28, 2014. Accessed June 15, 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/28/barack-obama-
saudi-arabia-syria-iran. 
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preservation of the status quo, and preserving the Saudi regional hegemony.
5
 Despite the 
fact that these responses may seem at odd with each other and inconsistent, this thesis try 
to place Saudi policy vis-à-vis the Arab Spring in perspective so that such seeming 
contradictions can be explained.  
In order to provide a comprehensive analysis to the policy of Saudi Arabia towards the 
Arab Spring, the thesis will examine the perceived threats to the Saudi national interests 
as a result of the Arab Spring. The thesis will also examine the capabilities and resources 
as elements of the intervening variable, which were instrumental in both the formulation 
and implementation of the Saudi policy. These aspects will be studied from a 
Neoclassical Realist approach which offers a conceptualization of foreign policy by 
analyzing both the system-level and unit-level without annulling any of them. The 
approach puts more emphasis on the domestic aspects as an intervening variable in the 
relation between the external environment and the foreign policy decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Jared Feldschreiber, "Shifting Regional Interests for Saudi Arabia and Jordan." RIA Novosti. September 
12, 2014. Accessed August 2, 2014. http://en.ria.ru/authors/20140912/192873268/Shifting-Regional-
Interests-for-Saudi-Arabia-and-Jordan.html. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In order to examine the policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring, the thesis raises 
the following questions: 
1. How a conservative status quo power like Saudi Arabia served its objectives in a 
revolutionary environment? 
2. What makes Saudi Arabia apply the observed contradictory standards in dealing 
with the Arab Spring? 
In order to answer the first research question about how a conservative status quo served 
its objectives in a revolutionary environment, it is essential to analyze the Kingdom’s 
capabilities which have been deployed to formulate the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
and how it used these capabilities to deal with the perceived threats. Analyzing the 
capabilities of Saudi Arabia that contributed to the formulation and implementation of 
policies, this should help understanding the way in which Saudi Arabia served its 
objectives, or how it is trying to achieve them in a revolutionary environment. The 
capabilities will be assessed vis-à-vis the threats as perceived by the Saudi leaders as a 
part of the intervening variable of Neoclassical Realist approach, in order to eventually 
offer an explanation of the foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab 
Spring.  
In order to tackle the second research question concerned with the contradictory 
standards that Saudi Arabia applied towards the Arab Spring, it is necessary to define and 
analyze some of the threats that Saudi Arabia is facing as a result of the Arab Spring and 
how Saudi leaders perceived and confronted these threats to name a few: calls for 
domestic protests in Saudi Arabia, the Iranian influence in the region, the rise of the role 
14 
 
Muslim Brotherhood, the emerging regional competition with Qatar and terrorism.  
Through analyzing and studying the threats that Saudi Arabia is facing as a result of the 
Arab Spring, it will be possible to answer the research question about the reasons of the 
contradictory standards of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring.  
The thesis hypothesizes several statements that will be qualitatively tested but essentially 
used to guide the research process. These include the following: 
 
1. Saudi policy towards Arab Spring is highly consistent regardless of the apparent 
inconsistency 
2. Foreign policy of Saudi Arabia experiences a pivotal shift as a result of the Arab 
Spring, where Saudi policy is showing more assertiveness and risk prone 
tendencies. 
3. The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is formed by hard core security and political 
interests rather than religious motives 
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Literature Review 
The literature published before the Arab Spring was mainly concerned with analyzing the 
foreign policy of Saudi Arabia and the determinants that the Saudi foreign policy is based 
upon. The chapter by Bahgat Korany and Moataz A. Fatah offers a quality overview of 
the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, the domestic environment of the Kingdom, and how 
the changes in domestic and international levels influence the foreign policy of Saudi 
Arabia. The authors present the domestic environment of Saudi Arabia through 
discussing several determinants as a general framework in formulating the foreign policy 
of Saudi Arabia such as “geography and geopolitics, social structure of population, 
economic and military capabilities, political structure, the legitimizing function of Islam, 
and pressures for political reform”.6 Some of the determinants presented in this chapter 
will be analyzed in this thesis to determine their impact in formulating the foreign policy 
of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring.  In addition, the authors offer an emphasis on 
the varying interest groups in the Kingdom and the pressures for reform and change to 
the political structure. This can be used for the analysis used from Neoclassical Realist 
approach as one of the intervening variables to study the relationship between systemic 
level and the foreign policy behavior. 
Korany and A. Fattah offer an explanation of the Saudi foreign policy orientation and 
behavior at both the regional and global levels. The authors argue that the foreign policy 
orientation of Saudi Arabia is based on religious and economic factors, particularly being 
the world largest exporter of oil. The authors offer examples of the significance of 
                                                          
6
 Bahgat Korany and Moataz A. Fattah, "Irreconcilable Role-Partners? Saudi Foreign Policy between the 
Ulama and the US." In The Foreign Policies of Arab States The Challenge of Globalization, 347-362. 
Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2008. 
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religion in legitimizing the Kingdom’s foreign policy. For instance, the Saudi peace 
initiative of 2002, in which a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 
was demanded in exchange for normal peace relations between Israel and Arab countries. 
This Saudi initiative was based on an “Islamic fatwa (jurisprudence) to put Israel in the 
category of dar al-‘ahd (‘territory of covenant’) rather than dar al-harb (‘territory of 
war’)”.7 As for the economic factors, the authors assert the significance of Saudi Arabia 
being the largest exporter of oil, which gives the state valuable resources important to 
implement its foreign policy. The authors argue that “Islam and Oil are two bases of the 
country’s foreign policy”8, and together they provide Saudi Arabia with both soft and 
material powers to achieve its goals.   
Alternatively, other scholars focus on what they describe as pillars of Saudi foreign 
policy. Alan Munro argues that the Saudi foreign policy has been depending on the 
“balancing of two distinct pillars”9. Firstly, Saudi Arabia tries to guarantee its national 
security and to provide stable oil exports through having a close alliance with Western 
countries especially the United States. Secondly, the other pillar is to preserve the leading 
role of Saudi Arabia within the Islamic world as the custodian of the two holiest shrines 
in Islam; this pillar requires Saudi Arabia to expand its foreign policy influence into a 
larger regional and international presence to include the whole Muslim world. Within this 
two pillars design, the author addresses issues that are of high concern to the Saudi 
foreign policy such as regional rivalries and threats as well as the issue of Palestine, 
claiming that the policy of Saudi Arabia towards these issues are mostly influenced by 
                                                          
7
 Ibid 363.  
8
 Ibid, 365.  
9
 Alan Munro, "The Dilemma for Saudi Foreign Policy." The RUSI Journal, 2008, 46. 
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the two aforementioned strategic pillars.
10
 However, the author argues that the impact of 
important developments such as the Iranian Revolution and the end of Cold War 
stimulated Saudi Arabia to give a greater “attention to regional and Islamic sentiment in 
the conduct of Saudi overseas relations”,11 where Saudi Arabia cannot highly count on its 
western dependence with the increasing political sentiments against the West in the 
Islamic world. Neil Partrick adopts different two pillars argument about the Saudi 
position of “a defense alignment with the United States, and the assertion of Arab and 
Islamic norms.”12 The author argues that Saudi Arabia is trying to maintain the balance 
between these two pillars. Although the United States and Saudi Arabia have a common 
interest in containing Iran, nevertheless Saudi Arabia is aware that the American agenda 
might conflict with Saudi ideological standards on issues such as its relation with Israel 
and the American policy in Iraq. Furthermore, Mai Yamani demonstrates in her work that 
Saudi Arabia, assisted by its oil wealth and its religious significance as the custodian of 
the two holiest Islamic places, is a major active player in the Middle East. The author 
asserts that Saudi Arabia’s main concern is to contain the Iranian influence and the Shiite 
threat, which the Saudi government considers as the greatest threat to the Middle East 
stability.
13
 Additionally, according to Yamani, Saudi Arabia presents itself as a more 
moderate example in contrast to Iran which is aggressively challenging the United States 
and labeling it as “the Great Satan” and aims to wipe Israel off the map. However, the 
author claims that Saudi possession of oil and its status as the custodian of Islam’s holy 
sites would not guarantee long term security for Saudi Arabia, especially domestically, 
                                                          
10
 Ibid, 46. 
11
 Ibid, 47. 
12
 Neil Partrick, "Discreet Persuasion." The World Today 64, no. 7 (2008): 21. 
13
 Mai Yamani, "The Two Faces Of Saudi Arabia." Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 2008,153. 
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and that the continued reliance on these resources to evade addressing domestic demands 
will make Saudi Arabia vulnerable to further threats.  Instead, Yamani argues that Saudi 
Arabia should discontinue its repression of the Shiite minority and improve their social 
and political status within the Kingdom in order to rally the Saudi population at the 
regime’s side.14 However, such action could undermine one of the two pillars of Al-Saud 
rule and could result in a confrontation with the hardliner Wahhabi clergy.  
The views presented in the previous paragraph mainly emphasize the significance of oil 
and Islam as two factors in determining the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia. However, the 
importance of these factors that they are mainly employed to serve the interests of Saudi 
Arabia to ensure its survival and regional stability, which will be analyzed along with 
other factors throughout this thesis. These factors have given Saudi Arabia an important 
role in the international system and equipped the Kingdom with tools to confront external 
pressures and threats. 
While Mai Yamani emphasizes the sectarian, i.e., Sunni versus Shiite, dimension of 
Saudi foreign policy, F. Gregory Gause III offers another perspective. He argues that 
Saudi Arabia is dealing with the Iranian influence in the region from the perception of 
balance of power politics and not sectarianism. Gause further demonstrates that Saudi 
Arabia deals with the issue as an increasing Iranian power and not Shiite power; he 
supports his claim through the fact the Saudis invited Sunni and Shiite clerics to a 
meeting in Mecca, where they issued a statement condemning sectarian violence. In 
addition, King Abdullah allowed Shiites to elect representatives for Municipal council 
                                                          
14
 Ibid, 154-155. 
19 
 
elections in 2005 and they were also allowed to publicly celebrate their feast of Ashura.
15
 
Gause’s analysis of the Saudi foreign policy asserts that Saudi Arabia is concerned with 
balancing the Iranian power rather than fighting Shiite presence. From a realist 
perspective, Gause argues that failure to balance Iranian power could undermine the 
survival and stability of Saudi Arabia. From a Neoclassical Realist perspective, such 
attempt to balance the influence of Iran in the region requires the mobilization of Saudi 
resources and formation of alliances to counter such threat. Changing patterns of resource 
mobilization and alliance formation in the wake of the Arab Spring is addressed in this 
thesis.  
On the other hand, the literature on Saudi foreign policy following the Arab Spring is 
mainly focusing on two trends. Firstly, how Saudi Arabia has maintained stability and 
regional status quo through the deployment of Saudi capabilities. Secondly, the factors 
and threats that made Saudi Arabia react to the Arab Spring in a manner that is seemingly 
characterized by contradictions, counterrevolutionary, and multiple standards. 
Nonetheless, few have attempted to take into considerations the two trends altogether. 
Moreover, the literature reviewed generally did not offer an assessment of the 
significance of the Arab Spring to Saudi Arabia from a theoretical approach rooted in 
International Relations theory, a shortcoming that will be addressed in this thesis. 
One of the obvious trends in the literature on Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring was 
highly characterized by pointing out the capabilities of Saudi Arabia that helped the 
Kingdom to remain trouble free in the course of the Arab Spring, as well as allowing 
                                                          
15
 F. Gregory Gause III, "Saudi Arabia: Iraq, Iran, the Regional Power Balance, and the Sectarian 
Question." Strategic Insights VI, no. 2 (2007): 1-8. 
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Saudi Arabia to maintain a certain level of stability and regional status quo. Steve A. 
Yetiv argues that Saudi Arabia remained “springless”; as being a rentier state the 
Kingdom used oil wealth to strengthen the regime against threats to its survival.
16
 Rentier 
resources allowed Saudi Arabia to navigate through the trouble of the Arab Spring, along 
with other important factors. These factors include the popularity of King Abdullah when 
compared to other Arab autocrats, the tight control the Al Saud family has over the 
different political and national institutions, and that the Kingdom generally is not under 
international pressures from Western countries especially the United States to reform and 
democratize due to the strategic importance of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Tobey Craig 
Jones demonstrates the method of counterrevolution implemented by Saudi Arabia 
domestically and regionally through the usage of oil revenues, the forces of Islamic 
radicalism, and sectarianism to ensure the survival of the Kingdom and its regional 
hegemony.
17
 Jones also discusses the methods of counterrevolution used by Saudi 
Arabia, notably the special relationship between the ruling family and the clergy where 
religion is used to support the regime’s legitimacy.  Furthermore, Crystal A. Ennis and 
Bessma Momani demonstrate the foreign policy strategy of Saudi Arabia towards the 
events of the Arab Spring, arguing that since early 2011, Saudi Arabia redesigned its 
strategy mainly to contain the revolutionary influence of the Arab Spring and to maintain 
regional balance of power. This has been achieved by Saudi Arabia through using oil rent 
and the religious significance it posses, which give the regime sharp legitimacy.
18
 Such 
                                                          
16
 Steve A. Yetiv, "Oil, Saudi Arabia, and the Spring That Has Not Come." In The Arab Spring: Change 
and Resistance in the Middle East, 99-100. Westview Press, 2012. 
17
 Toby Craig Jones, "Saudi Arabia Versus the Arab Spring." Raritan: A Quarterly Review 31, no. 2, 45. 
http://raritanquarterly.rutgers.edu/files/article-pdfs/toby-jones-raritan-fall-2011.pdf. 
18
 Crystal A. Ennis and Bessma Momani, "Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: 
Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies." Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6, 1127-1144. 
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capabilities and strategies as presented by Yetiv, Jones, Ennis and Momani are not 
different nor fresh since the literature before the Arab Spring used oil and religious 
significance as the two factors in formulating the Saudi policy. Yet how Saudi Arabia 
used such tools have evolved in dealing with the Arab Spring and will be put under 
analysis through this thesis.    
Another trend in the analysis of the post Arab Spring’s literature, Saudi foreign policy is 
mainly characterized by emphasizing the threats that shape the policy of Saudi Arabia 
and its reactions to the Arab Spring. Arial Jahner argues that the Arab Spring intensified 
the competition for leadership between Saudi Arabia and Iran; the two countries that 
better represent the sectarian division between the Sunni and Shiite Muslims, in addition 
to other factors, especially competition in oil production and ambitions for Gulf 
hegemony between the two powers.
19
 Mohamed Ayoub in his work demonstrates 
somehow a combination of the two trends. He argues that oil wealth gives Saudi Arabia 
the means to face the internal and external threats and to direct its foreign policy to 
control the Iranian influence; in addition to, its respectable demographic base, modern 
weaponry, its role in multilateral organizations such as the GCC, and its position as the 
protector of Sunni Islam against Shiite Islam sponsored by Iran.  Yet Ayoob warns that 
Saudi Arabia is vulnerable, lacks political institutions, and heavily dependent on wealth 
generated from oil. He argues that the seemingly contradictions in Saudi foreign policy 
“in dealing with the Arab spring are likely to limit its regional appeal and affect its 
                                                          
19
 Ariel Jahner, "SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the 
Gulf."INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW XX, no. 3 (2012): 37-50. 
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diplomacy”,20 especially towards Arab countries that experienced mass revolts. Prince 
Turki Al Faisal, former head of the Saudi General Intelligence, in his address to the 22
nd
 
annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference in Washington, D.C., on October 22, 2013 
offered a Saudi view of the Saudi foreign policy. He briefly explains the reasons for 
Saudi Arabia’s self-confidence in the world affairs which is mainly due to that it is the 
cradle of Islam and its economic growth. Subsequently, Al Faisal demonstrates Saudi 
Arabia overall goals in the region which he defines as “to strengthen their allies in the 
region and to assist their neighbors to maintain stability”.21  Al Faisal also points out in 
his address the threat of Iran who portrays itself as not only the leader of the Shiite 
minority but as the leader of all Muslim revolutionaries and the concerns of Saudi Arabia 
towards the Iranian nuclear program, in addition to Iranian destabilizing efforts in Arab 
countries with Shiite majority and significant Shiite minority. Prince Turki Al Faisal 
asserted that Saudi Arabia intends to oppose Iranian interference in the domestic affairs 
of other Arab countries.  
Guido Steinberg focuses on the counterrevolutionary strategy applied by Saudi Arabia 
towards the Arab Spring. The author argues that Saudi Arabia has emerged as a leader of 
the Gulf monarchies and wealthy oil producing countries by using its oil revenues, 
historical significance and religious legitimacy. Steinberg offers an inclusive analysis on 
the domestic challenges resulting from the Arab Spring and how the Al Saud’s regime 
dealt with the protests that occurred in Saudi Arabia whether carried by the Islamist or 
liberal opposition in addition to the Shiite protests movement. Afterward, Steinberg 
                                                          
20
 Mohammed Ayoob, "The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance." Middle East Policy XIX, no. 3 
(2012): 84-97. 
21
 Turki Al Faisal, "Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy." Middle East Policy XX, no. 4 (20123): 37-44. 
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discusses Saudi Arabia’s “new offensive regional policy” towards Iran that was apparent 
through three fundamental actions. Firstly, through strengthening the Saudi allied regimes 
in the region and limiting the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood like in the case of 
Egypt. Secondly, the Saudi military intervention in Bahrain against the Shiite protests 
that threatened the stability of the friendly Al Khalifa’s regime; and finally, the support of 
Saudi Arabia to the rebels in Syria against the regime of Bashar Al Assad
22
, which is 
described as a proxy war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. Such new offensive strategy shows the Saudi firm position towards threats that 
emerged as a result of the Arab Spring. According to Steinberg, this offensive strategy is 
seen as a change in formulating Saudi foreign policy from trying to influence the events 
mostly through its economic capability and religious influence before the Arab Spring to 
more aggressive actions to the extent of military intervention during the Arab Spring.   
The literature shows, as mentioned previously, two obvious trends in analyzing the policy 
of Saudi Arabia, particularly in the context of the Arab Spring. Most of the works have 
been concerned with either explaining the means used by Saudi Arabia and its 
capabilities to maintain regional stability and to preserve the status quo to ultimately 
ensure its survival and regional hegemony. The other trend focuses on the threats facing 
Saudi Arabia which increased in the wake of the Arab Spring and the measures Saudi 
Arabia are taken to confront such threats. 
This thesis will build on the literature reviewed in an attempt to combine the mentioned 
trends and to offer a more comprehensive view of the policy of Saudi Arabia towards the 
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Arab Spring. Obviously, the literature reviewed demonstrates the prevalence of the realist 
approach in the explanation of Saudi policy vis-á-vis the Arab Spring, that is while some 
of the literature is concerned in analyzing the state’ capabilities and the other focuses on 
the threats facing Saudi Arabia and politics of balancing such threats. Both trends deal 
with the state as the main actor that matters regardless of the revolutionary developments 
that swiped the region. In order to effectively analyze and study the aforementioned 
research questions that this thesis seeks to examine, the thesis will be combining and 
assessing both the threats facing Saudi Arabia and the capabilities of Saudi Arabia that 
help in formulating the Saudi policy.  
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Conceptual Framework 
Realism is characterized by being an evolving approach that tries to provide an 
acceptable explanation to what is happening in international relations. Realism is known 
as an approach with an evolutionary path which led to the emergence of many trends 
within the realist perspective from Classical Realism to Neoclassical Realism. In order to 
have a better understanding of Neoclassical Realism, it is necessary to understand how it 
relates to other approaches within the Realist theory. All three approaches: Classical 
Realism, Neo-Realism and Neoclassical Realism share some basic assumptions 
concerning the nature of international relations. Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, three 
prominent scholars who have contributed to the articulation of Neoclassical Realism, 
argue that all realist approaches agree that human beings are unable to survive 
individually and must be members of larger groups to guarantee their security against 
external enemies. Secondly, politics is a struggle between self-interested groups due to 
scarcity and uncertainty in the world. Thirdly, the element of power is an essential factor 
for any group in order to secure its goals.
23
   
Neoclassical Realist approach agrees with Neo-Realism that systemic factors determine 
the broad direction of the policy. Neoclassical Realism also concurs with Classical 
Realism that foreign policy is made at the state level by political leaders, where it adds 
that domestic factors intervene in formulating the policies undertaken by leaders. 
According to Gidon Rose, “the world leaders are constrained with both international and 
domestic politics”,24 Neoclassical Realism demonstrates the importance of linking both 
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domestic factors and the effects of systemic factors to provide an explanation for foreign 
policy decisions.   
Classical Realism defines the foreign policy of states as a struggle for power in the 
absence of a greater authority in the international system. It holds that states are rational 
and that they are the most important actors in international arena who seek security and 
power maximization to protect their national interests. However, Neo-Realists criticize 
Classical Realism for focusing too much on the behavior of states while ignoring the 
structure of the international system. Neo-Realism agrees with Classical Realism that the 
state is the main actor in the anarchic international system, and claims that rationality is 
what defines the behavior of the states.
25
 However, Neo-Realism asserts that there is no 
relationship between domestic and foreign politics, and denies internal factors any 
explanatory power towards the understanding of the foreign policy behavior of states. 
Neo-Realism proponents assert that only the structure of the international system is what 
determines the foreign policy behavior of states. 
Neoclassical Realism as a variant of realist theory finds significance in the role of internal 
factors in defining the traditional power politics. This is definitely different from Neo-
Realism as outlined by Kenneth Waltz which asserts that all states are equal within the 
international structure and adopt similar adaptive strategies.
26
 Nevertheless, Neoclassical 
Realism claims that domestic factors work as an intervening variable in the formulation 
of foreign policy behavior. Neoclassical Realism approaches foreign policy from within 
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the state through putting emphasis on the role of domestic factors in determining the 
formation of the foreign policy. Neoclassical Realism proponents assert the role of 
domestic factors in framing the limit of traditional power politics, which is affected by 
key features in internal politics such as the perceptions of the leaders and the ruling 
system of government.
27
   
Since the work of Rose in 1998 naming the approach of Neoclassical Realism, many 
scholars have worked to develop the concept of intervening variable in the making of 
foreign policy of states. The intervening variable according to Neoclassical Realist 
analysis is particularly identified with the domestic factors that affect the behavior of the 
state towards the external environment, which mediate the relationship between the 
independent variable (structural/systemic) and the dependent variable (foreign policy 
outcomes/behavior).   
 
Chart 1- Neoclassical Realism (function of the intervening variable) 
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This intervening variable is defined to include factors such as the leaders’ perceptions of 
threats, the ability to mobilize the capabilities and domestic resources to deal with 
challenges. Neoclassical Realist approach tries to create an understandable model to 
analyze the foreign policy through not relying only on external factors or internal factors 
alone, which proponents of Neoclassical Realism consider that taking any of these factors 
alone will be insufficient and shortsighted. Rather, the approach makes a connection 
between internal and external factors which makes Neoclassical Realism more 
comprehensive in analyzing foreign policy. Neoclassical Realism proponents argue that 
the foreign policy of a specific state is the result of complex relations between 
international structure and domestic factors. Accordingly, a state may have a different set 
of policies available to it that are determined by systemic factors, but the option it selects 
is based on its domestic factors such as the ability to mobilize its resources and 
capabilities to deal with a specific challenge or threat. Therefore, according to 
Neoclassical Realist approach that two states may face the same systemic challenges, yet 
they may adopt different policies to deal with these challenges based on their different 
domestic factors. 
This thesis will use the framework of Neoclassical Realism to explain the foreign policy 
of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring. The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia could be 
studied by looking into it from a Neoclassical Realist perspective which integrates both 
external and domestic factors to provide meaningful explanation of the foreign policy of 
states.
28
  Since the domestic policies of Saudi Arabia and the internal factors within the 
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state contribute to the framing of its foreign policy, thus Neoclassical Realism is best to 
analyze such subject. Since Neo-Realists are concerned “with the international structure 
and relative capabilities of the great powers and neglected the impact of domestic 
political forces such as public opinion, legislature, and privileged interest groups”,29 
while Neoclassical Realists take into considerations the effect of domestic political 
considerations as well as systemic explanation. Moreover, Neoclassical Realism holds 
that both the structure of the international system and leaders’ ideology and perceptions 
have impacts in determining the country’s foreign policy. Generally, in order to 
understand the foreign policy from Neoclassical Realist approach it is necessary to 
acknowledge the relative power of the state and its exposure to imperatives generated by 
the anarchic international system,
30
 in addition to the domestic factors like the 
perceptions of specific events and the ability of the state to use resources to pursue a 
particular policy.  
The broad applicability of Neoclassical Realism as a standpoint to explain the foreign 
policy makes it a good fit for the research topic at hand. Neoclassical Realist approach 
agrees with Neo-Realism that systemic factors determine the broad direction of foreign 
policy,
31
 this is for Saudi Arabia could be translated in the regional and international 
threats that the country faces as a result of the Arab Spring. However, Neoclassical 
Realism asserts that the state's foreign policy in response to threats is a function of 
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domestic factors such as the government capabilities, political structure, and interest 
groups.  
Neoclassical Realist approach concurs with Classical Realism that foreign policy is 
shaped at the state level by political leaders, which is very obvious in the case of Saudi 
Arabia, where the foreign policy towards the Arab Spring is largely formulated by the 
political leaders and the domestic factors that intervene in forming the political judgments 
of the leaders. In addition, Neoclassical Realism emphasizes that the goal of states is to 
increase their relative power to ultimately ensure their security, which is implemented 
through the use of physical and ideological tools. Thus, the usage of physical power such 
as oil and military force along with the religious significance of Saudi Arabia could be 
effectively understood if analyzed from Neoclassical Realist perspective. Neoclassical 
Realists take into considerations the role of government and decision makers in dealing 
with external threats and challenges. In brief, Neoclassical Realist approach deals with 
the systemic level as an independent variable and the foreign policy of a specific country 
as a dependent variable; while the capabilities of the country, the agents of foreign policy 
and the internal factors work as an intermediate/intervening variable between the 
independent and the dependent variables. The difference between Neoclassical Realism 
and other branches in the school of Realism is mainly based on their emphasis on the 
internal factors of countries which influence their foreign policy.  
Neoclassical Realism is a relatively new approach in international relations, yet it 
has highly promising ability to build on preceding Realist approaches through trying 
to develop a general explanation of international politics and insights on the analysis 
of foreign policy. Neoclassical Realism succeeded to open the black box of the state, 
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which was imposed by Neo-Realist approach, through including internal factors 
within the state in their analysis of international politics. Finally with an effective 
conceptual framework in place, it becomes possible to start examining the impact of 
the Arab Spring on the foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia; through analyzing 
the perceptions of the threats arising from the Arab Spring and the capabilities that 
Saudi Arabia has at its disposal in dealing with these threats. 
Research Significance  
Since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011 which took everyone by 
surprise, Saudi Arabia was faced by many security challenges such as threats of 
domestic dissent, spillover effect of revolts in other countries, increasing Iranian 
influence in the region, regional competition with Qatar, and rise of political Islam 
especially the Muslim Brotherhood. All these challenges as well as the changes in 
the regional balance of power in the Middle East with the fall of strong regimes due 
to developments especially in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen has placed Saudi 
Arabia in a confrontation with these threats, and with the tools that Saudi Arabia 
posses gave it the ability to have a more strategic role in the region.   
The answer on how Saudi Arabia is dealing with the events of the Arab Spring has 
been pressing and the attempts to understand the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
towards the Arab Spring were not few as presented in the literature. However, they 
missed offering a comprehensive analysis of the policy of Saudi Arabia towards the 
Arab Spring that combines the threats that the Kingdom faces in the wake of the 
Arab Spring and the capabilities of Saudi Arabia that helps it to formulate its 
pragmatic policy. The thesis aims to pursue such comprehensive analysis taking into 
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consideration an approach from the field of International Relations to tackle the 
research questions of this study. Aforementioned, Neoclassical Realism was chosen 
as an approach to offer an explanation to the foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia 
towards the Arab Spring. This is essentially due to emphasis of Neoclassical Realism 
on internal factors in formulating the foreign policy behavior of states and not only 
focusing on the structure of the international system.  
Moreover, the main objective of this thesis is to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring with a greater focus on how a 
conservative status quo like Saudi Arabia served its objectives in a revolutionary 
environment through the assessment of the capabilities that the Kingdom had at its 
disposal in dealing with the threats resulting from the Arab Spring. The thesis aims 
also to identify why Saudi Arabia reacted differently with some sort of contradictory 
standards to the events of the Arab Spring in countries that experienced mass 
protests, regime change and civil unrest within the Arab world.  
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The Outline 
The thesis contains five chapters. The first chapter explains the topic, presents the 
research problem, the research questions and the hypotheses. This chapter includes also 
the literature review and the conceptual framework chosen to analyze the topic at hand. 
The second chapter presents the threats that Saudi Arabia is facing and how it perceived 
them as result of the Arab Spring -to name a few- Iranian influence in the region, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the rising regional role of Qatar, domestic dissent in Saudi Arabia 
and terrorism. The chapter analyzes the challenges threatening Saudi Arabia and how it 
dealt with them since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, in order to offer an explanation of 
the Saudi foreign policy towards the Arab Spring. In addition, the chapter offers an 
overview of the role of domestic groups in Saudi Arabia during the events of Arab 
Spring.  
The third chapter explains the capabilities of Saudi Arabia and the ability to mobilize 
them which contributes in shaping and formulating the Saudi foreign policy towards the 
Arab Spring; such as economic capability, religious capability, military capability, and 
geographic capability.  
The fourth chapter offers an analysis and explains the policy outcome of Saudi Arabia 
towards the Arab Spring. This chapter offers three main outcomes of the Saudi foreign 
policy towards the Arab Spring such as preservation of the status quo, balance of power, 
power and opportunity aspects.     
The last chapter is the conclusion of the study which offers answers to the research 
questions and discusses the hypotheses. The chapter concludes the study and provides a 
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summarized understanding of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab 
Spring. 
Method and Data  
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis depends on both primary and 
secondary sources. The primary sources which will be used are statements by Saudi 
officials mostly the King and the Saudi minister of foreign affairs, which will be 
analyzed through applying a content analysis of statements and speeches from 2008 
to 2014, four years before the outbreak of the Arab Spring and four years after. 
Despite that the content analysis might not be of great addition to this study, 
however, it was mainly applied to support claims raised throughout this thesis and 
provide originality to this study. The content analysis applied aims to understand and 
analyze the official stance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and determines the Saudi 
responses to important political issues, the content analysis will used to support and 
offer evidence to claims used in this thesis. Secondary sources such as books, 
academic journal, newspapers and articles will be used to study other works and 
researches done by scholars trying to assess and explain the Saudi foreign policy in 
general and towards the Arab Spring specifically, as well as in order to offer 
supporting evidence to the arguments of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Saudi perception to the threats of the Arab Spring and the role of 
domestic groups 
Saudi Arabia faced several threats as a result of the Arab Spring. From a Neoclassical 
Realist approach, the perception of the threats by the leaders and decision makers 
cultivated from a specific event works as an intermediate variable in forming the foreign 
policy behavior of a state. In addition, the internal factors in the country contribute in the 
evaluation of the international challenges and affect the foreign policy behavior. The 
Saudi perceptions of the threats resulting from the Arab Spring will be discussed 
throughout this chapter such as: the increasing Iranian influence in the region, the rise of 
Muslim Brotherhood, regional competition with Qatar, terrorism and domestic dissent in 
the Kingdom. These threats were essentially sparked by the Tunisian revolution which 
brought an end to the regime of president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Later in Egypt, the 
revolts developed and eventually led to the overthrow of the Mubarak’s regime that was 
closely allied to Saudi Arabia, since this development Saudi Arabia was alerted to the 
effect of Arab Spring and feared a spillover effect in other Arab countries or even in 
Saudi Arabia. As a result, Saudi Arabia perceived several threats to its national interests 
as direct effect of the Arab Spring with developments emerging in other countries 
especially in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen where a regime change will compromise the 
security and stability of the Kingdom.  
The perception of these threats along with other internal factors of the country contributes 
in the formation of the Saudi foreign policy behavior towards the Arab Spring. This 
chapter offers an explanation of the contradictory standards of Saudi Arabia towards the 
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Arab Spring through analyzing the threats and how they are perceived by Saudi leaders. 
In order to effectively assess the reason behind the contradictory standards of Saudi 
Arabia towards the Arab Spring, it is necessary to analyze how Saudi leaders perceived 
and dealt with these threats unleashed by the Arab Spring. Since the perception of these 
threats and the Saudi position towards them will eventually offer an explanation to the 
reactions of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring.    
Iranian Influence in the Region  
Since the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 
1979, and the Saudi-Iranian relations have been disintegrated, leading to a break of 
diplomatic ties in 1988.
32
 Saudi leaders have viewed the Islamic Republic of Iran as a 
threat to the Kingdom’s stability and a destabilizing force with the Iranian attempts to 
export its revolution to other states especially in the Gulf region. The relations between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia kept worsening in the following years especially during the First 
Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, where Saudi Arabia was supporting Saddam Hussein 
politically and economically during his campaign against Iran. Saudi Arabia, fearing the 
ideological influence of Iran and victory over Iraq, has provided billions of dollars to 
Saddam Hussein to guarantee his victory over Iran.
33
 Additionally, in response to the 
Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq war, Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates established the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 
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mainly as a security organization that maintains an anti-Iranian political agenda to 
guarantee the survival of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf region.
34
 With the fall of the 
regime of Saddam Hussein after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Saudi-Iranian relations 
further deteriorated. This deterioration post the invasion of Iraq is due to Iranian growing 
quest for power and influence in Iraq and the region, which widened the gap and caused a 
sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites not only in Iraq but also in other countries 
with significant Shiite population. In addition, the Iranian nuclear program poses a threat 
to Saudi Arabia since if Iran successfully developed nuclear weapons; this will definitely 
change the balance of power in the whole region and will comprise the security of Saudi 
Arabia. 
With the change in the regional balance due to the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has feared 
from the growing Iranian influence in the region as both countries have an opportunity 
for regional predominance. Saudi Arabia which already has a historical experience with 
revolutions that toppled the regimes such as that of Iran in 1979 and fears about growing 
Iranian influence in countries where the wave of the Arab Spring hit. The Saudi 
perception of increasing Iranian influence is based on the change of regional balance of 
power resulting from the Arab Spring. Saudi Arabia has lost several Arab allies most 
notably in Egypt and Tunisia yet this does not mean necessarily it lost them to Iran. 
However, regime changes in these countries have brought new regimes that are not yet 
trustworthy to Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom was unable to predict their stance within 
the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry. Additionally, the region has been divided for decades 
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into an Iranian led block and a Saudi led block, and with the developments of the Arab 
Spring this has suddenly introduced the possibility of several other blocks like a Muslim 
Brotherhood led block or a democratic block that might seek closer ties with Iran. The 
introduction of these possible new blocks at the expense of former strong allies to Saudi 
Arabia such as in Egypt and Tunisia, were alarming to Saudi leaders. Accordingly, Saudi 
leaders realized that it is necessary to restore the regional balance of power regardless 
such balancing policy will place Saudi Arabia as supporter of revolutionary movements 
in some cases or anti-revolutionary in other cases. Therefore Saudi Arabia has decided to 
take part in toppling the Assad’s regime in Syria out of the concept of balancing the 
power of Iran, and that Iran should lose regional allies as Saudi Arabia had. 
When the Arab Spring reached Syria, an Arab cold war erupted between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia, where Iran supported the regime of Bashar Al Assad and Saudi Arabia supported 
the opposition. Such struggle has introduced a sectarian conflict once again between 
Sunnis and Shiites throughout the region. Iran support to the Assad’s regime is based on 
being Iran’s primary Arab ally and an essential tool for Iranian military and financial 
support to Hezbollah in Lebanon. In contrast Saudi Arabia is supporting the Sunni 
dominated opposition due to the relationship of the Assad’s regime with Iran and the 
deteriorated Saudi-Syrian relations under the Assad’s regime.35 Saudi Arabia is highly 
concerned with the conflict in Syria and took a strong position against the Assad’s 
regime. Syria became a central issue in the Saudi foreign policy; this is evident in the 
content analysis conducted for documents from the Saudi ministry of foreign affairs. The 
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results show a significant increase in mentioning Syria in documents post the Arab 
Spring, chart 2 shows 0% occurrence of mentioning Syria before the Arab Spring to 
32.7% after the Arab Spring within a list of several other countries. 
 
Chart 2- Countries Mentioned (before and after the Arab Spring) 
With the development of the conflict, Saudi Arabia has taken more severe position 
towards Syria to the extent of calling for military intervention from the international 
community and asking for sanctions on Syria to put an end to the Assad’s regime that has 
lost legitimacy according to Saudi claims. Generally, Iran has viewed the Arab Spring as 
an opportunity to gain influence in the Arab World, especially in Egypt where the 
relations under the Mubarak’s regime were not in good terms. Iran’s Supreme leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called the Arab uprisings in the region as an “Islamic 
awakening” in reference to Iran’s Islamic Revolution,36 in a move to gain grounds in 
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countries, especially among the public, that experienced regime changes in the Arab 
region. For Iran, Syria is an important card to serve its interests in the Levant region and 
a pathway to Hezbollah to protect Iran against potential threats especially from Israel. As 
the conflict in Syria developed, Iran intervened militarily through Hezbollah and 
members of the Iranian Revolutionary guards that are fighting on the side of the Syrian 
regime to ensure the survival of the Assad’s regime against increased threats from armed 
groups supported by other countries, most notably Saudi Arabia.
37
 Such developments 
have turned the conflict in Syria into a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  
The reaction of Saudi Arabia towards the uprisings in Bahrain is yet another example of 
the perception of the Iranian threat by the Saudi leaders that increased with the waves of 
the Arab Spring. Soon after revolts erupted in Bahrain that essentially were calling for 
greater political freedom, equality for the majority Shiite population and later developed 
to calls demanding to oust the monarchial regime of Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. In 
response to the developments in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia within the frame of the GCC 
Peninsula Shield Force sent troops in March 2011 to protect the Al Khalifa’s regime 
against the protests calling for a regime change. Saudi Arabia militarily intervention in 
Bahrain is due to several factors that are associated mainly with the fear of increased 
Iranian influence in the Arabian Gulf. Bahrain that is geographically close to Saudi 
Arabia, a Sunni Arab monarchy with a majority of Shiite population, is a key ally to 
Saudi Arabia and thus any potential of an overthrow of the Al Khalifa’s ruling regime 
would challenge the stability to the Saudi regime itself and might bring a new regime 
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loyal to Iran. Saudi Arabia’s reaction to these uprisings in Bahrain is out of fear that Iran 
would gain more influence with the potential fall of the Bahraini regime in favor of the 
majority Shiite population in Bahrain and consequently in the Gulf region. Additionally, 
the Saudi military intervention within the GCC Peninsula Shield Force in Bahrain was to 
protect the Al Khalifa’s regime against protests and any attempts to compromise the 
survival and stability of the Bahraini ruling regime. Saudi Arabia has strongly provided 
financial support to Bahrain to enable the Al Khalifa’s regime to pursue same policy of 
rentierism that Saudi Arabia implements to reduce domestic pressures for reforms. In 
March, the GCC offered to Bahrain and Oman $20 billion financial package to provide 
more jobs, enhance their infrastructure and housing; as an attempt to provide these two 
Gulf monarchies with the tool to soothe protestors from revolting against the 
government.
38
 Such policies sponsored by Saudi Arabia have succeeded in neutralizing 
threats of protests against the Al Khalifa’s regime and protecting the regime in Bahrain 
from collapsing which may bring a new regime loyal to Iran.  
Saudi Arabia took a similar position yet less intense when the protests reached Yemen 
calling for the step down of the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Saudi Arabia, also through 
the frame of the GCC, has offered Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign in exchange for immunity 
and to transfer the presidential power to the vice president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi 
who was formally elected as a president later in February 2012. The deal was labeled as 
the “GCC initiative” and in earlier stages of the Syrian conflict; Saudi Arabia has offered 
to make such similar deal to solve the Syrian crisis through a peaceful transition of power 
plan. The main concern for Saudi Arabia is to maintain its influence in Yemen, preserves 
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stability and status quo through a loyal figure of the Yemeni regime. Such policy was out 
of fear that the conflict might turn into the favor to Iran, which has strong influence in 
Yemen especially through the armed Shiite group the Houthis who became the de facto 
ruling faction in Yemen in September 2014.
39
 Similar to the situation in Syria and 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has blamed external forces and publicly accused Iran for 
destabilizing these countries to increase its influence in the region and affect political 
outcomes.
40
 Saudi Arabia justified its military intervention in Bahrain, its support to the 
opposition in Syria and sponsoring the peaceful transfer of power in Yemen as a response 
to counter the Iranian intervention and influence in these countries. 
Saudi Arabia views Iran as a threat as it presents an alternative to the Saudi existence and 
having conflicting views over the interpretations of Islam between Wahhabi Sunni and 
Shiite, ambitions for leadership over the Islamic world, different oil production policy, 
the relations with the West and the system of government between monarchial regimes 
and revolutionary republics. The Iranian threat and how Saudi Arabia perceived it along 
with other threats’ perception and the internal factors during the events of the Arab 
Spring acted as an intermediate variable that has formulated the Saudi foreign policy 
toward the systemic pressure of the Arab Spring. Therefore, leaders in Saudi Arabia have 
adopted different policies to deal with these changes at the international level. For 
instance, when the revolts reached Bahrain and Yemen, which their regimes are allied to 
Saudi Arabia and guarantee its stability, there was a strong opposition from Saudi Arabia 
to the demands of the protestors though with some varying degrees from the Saudi 
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position in Bahrain and Yemen. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia saw it is necessary to intervene 
militarily to protect its interests through the protection of the monarchial regime of Al 
Khalifa. While in Yemen, Saudi Arabia offered an initiative to transfer the power of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh to his vice president, in order to avoid the fall of Yemen into chaos which 
will undermine the stability and security of Saudi Arabia. In Syria, where the Assad’s 
regime is loyal to Iran, Saudi Arabia extensively supported the opposition which it saw as 
an opportunity to gain grounds in Syria and topple an unfriendly regime affiliated with 
Iran on one hand; and to keep Iran preoccupied with what is happening in the Syrian 
conflict which will prevent Iran from having an active stance in the Gulf region that is 
more critical to the interests of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia realized that it is necessary for 
to protect its stability, preserve the status quo and its hegemony in the region over the 
threat of Iran that increased with the events of the Arab Spring. Accordingly, Saudi 
Arabia has formulated its foreign policy to check the power of Iran and to limit its ability 
to change the regional balance of power to ensure the survival of the Kingdom. Such 
different positions directed mainly to serve the Saudi national interests against the Iranian 
threat during the events of the Arab Spring is one of the reasons behind the apparent 
contradictions in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to Saudi Arabia’s stability 
Another perceived by Saudi Arabia as the result of the Arab Spring is the rise Muslim 
Brotherhood to power especially in Egypt. Saudi Arabia was not in favor to the protests 
that occurred in Egypt in January 2011 and was a major supporter to the Mubarak’s 
regime until it was overthrown. Saudi Arabia considers Egypt as a strong ally that has “a 
special place in Saudi security interests” and it was against abandoning Mubarak during 
44 
 
the protests against his rule.
41
 The reasons of the Saudi support to the Mubarak’s regime 
are firstly due to the Saudi concern of spill over of the wave of protests in the region and 
especially in the GCC countries. Secondly because Egypt under the Mubarak’s regime 
was a close ally to Saudi Arabia that shared its close alliance with the West and 
cooperated with Saudi Arabia in facing the Iranian threat through their shared stabilizing 
regional policy. With the fall of the Mubarak’s regime, Saudi Arabia feared that a change 
in the Egyptian policy will negatively affect the regional balance of power. Rapidly, the 
Kingdom offered financial support of $4 billion to the new government under the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces in Egypt in an attempt to influence the political 
developments in the post Mubarak’s Egypt.42 However, within the following few months 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has achieved significant political successes in the 
parliamentary elections and later their candidate Mohamed Morsi became the first 
Egyptian president in June 2012 post the 25
th
 of January revolution.  
The Saudi leaders’ perception of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat is out of ideological 
rivalry with the group. The Muslim Brotherhood also derives its legitimacy from Sunni 
interpretation of Islam which is regarded by the Al Saud as an alternative of the Saudi 
Wahhabi ideology with more revolutionary/republican aspects.
43
 The difference in 
interpretation of Islam between the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia lies in that the 
Saudi Wahhabi ideology is more religious and cultural in nature. Saudi Arabia is 
influencing the Muslim world as the country having a religious preference through 
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holding Islam holiest shrines. Alternatively, the interpretation of Islam according to the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology is more religious and political in nature with 
expansionist ambitions across the Muslim world to have central rule for Islamic countries 
and reviving an international project for the Islamic Caliphate.
44
   
Saudi Arabia feared that Muslim Brotherhood’s control of Egypt will affect the Egyptian 
foreign policy through one or all of the following scenarios. Firstly, Saudi Arabia feared 
that the Muslim Brotherhood will shift Egyptian foreign policy into rapprochement to 
Iran which will strengthen Iranian influence in the region. Whereas under the Mubarak’s 
regime, the relations between Egypt and Iran were deteriorated and such increase in 
Iranian relative power post the Arab Spring in the Middle East will be threatening to the 
interests of Saudi Arabia. The Egyptian-Iranian relations have slightly improved under 
the regime of Mohamed Morsi, as the leaders of both countries exchanged visits and 
there were talks about restoring full diplomatic representation between the two 
countries.
45
 Secondly, Saudi Arabia also feared that the Muslim Brotherhood’s regime in 
Egypt “might start a propaganda war against Israel and disseminate an anti-Israeli and 
anti-US policy” through supporting their sister group Hamas in Palestine,46  or supporting 
Iranian sponsored Hezbollah group in Lebanon which has witnessed close ties between 
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the two groups since the Muslim Brotherhood won the presidential elections in Egypt.
47
 
Such change in the Egyptian foreign policy will compromise the Saudi stability, since it 
will likely impress the Arab population and even the Saudi population. Such possible 
development may results in pressures on the Saudi regime for its close ties with the 
United States and it might be forced to shift its foreign policy to accommodate such new 
pressure, especially if the Muslim Brotherhood’s policy made a new escalation in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict which will force Saudi Arabia to take a position in such conflict. For 
Saudi Arabia, a renewed Arab-Israeli conflict will have severe impacts on its domestic 
policy, stability and economic security.
48
 Furthermore due to the regional presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in several Arab countries, Saudi Arabia also fears that the rule of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will gain popularity in the Arab World and within the 
Saudi population. Saudi citizens may perceive the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
ideology as an alternative to the Saudi Wahhabi ideology, since the Muslim Brotherhood 
also draw their political legitimacy as protectors of Islam from a conservative Sunni 
perspective and a substitute for the Al Saud’s monarchial system with their expansionist 
nature of political structure.     
Due to the perception of the leaders in Saudi Arabia of the Muslim Brotherhood as a 
threat to the Saudi national interests and the inability in seeing the Muslim Brotherhood 
in power especially in Egypt. In this context, Saudi Arabia has adopted a policy against 
the Muslim Brotherhood soon after the overthrow of the Mubarak’s regime through 
supporting another political faction in Egypt to balance the power of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia supported the Salafist movement and Al Nour political party 
that share the Saudi Wahhabi ideology during the parliamentary elections in Egypt in 
order to strengthen the rival of Muslim Brotherhood and gain grounds among 
conservatives in Egypt.
49
 Moreover, after the Egyptian military unseated Mohamed Morsi 
following massive protests in July 2013, Saudi Arabia has strongly supported the interim 
government and the military through offering billion of dollars as financial packages to 
Egypt’s new administration and declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist 
organization in March 2014.
50
 This apparent contradiction in the reaction of Saudi Arabia 
towards the protests that occurred in Egypt in 2011 and 2013 is clear evidence that Saudi 
Arabia is pursuing its own interests regardless of being adhering to specific values or 
principles on whether to support public demonstrations for reforms or not even in the 
same country. 
Obviously, Saudi leaders perceived the Muslim Brotherhood as threat to the Saudi 
interests both domestically and regionally. This perception has affected the foreign policy 
behavior of Saudi Arabia to the extent of causing a political conflict with another GCC 
country Qatar that is a strong supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood. Such political 
conflict reached its peak with the withdrawal of the Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati 
ambassadors from Qatar over its stance towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and 
elsewhere.
51
 As a result of the removal of Mohamed Morsi’s regime, the United States 
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has suspended its economic/military aid to Egypt, and Qatar asked Egypt to return billion 
of dollars given as financial aid to Egypt under the rule of Mohamed Morsi. However, 
Saudi Arabia vowed to provide financial support to Egypt to reimburse any losses from 
the suspended American aid or the withdrawal of Qatari financial packages. Such actions 
by Saudi Arabia post the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood government has benefited 
Saudi Arabia as they eliminated the risks of an Egyptian rapprochement to Iran and 
increasing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood inside Saudi Arabia and in other Arab 
countries. From a Neoclassical Realist perspective, such foreign policy behavior pursued 
by Saudi Arabia towards the Muslim Brotherhood falls within two types of balance of 
power. Firstly foreign balance, where the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in 
Egypt has to be restrained regionally, in order for Saudi Arabia to maximize its influence 
and guarantee its security through increasing its relative power which is necessary to 
pursue the Saudi national interests. Secondly internal balance, where the Saudi regime 
viewed that change in the elements of power in a neighboring country like Egypt will 
result in strengthening the power of other groups in Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
countries. Therefore it was necessary to balance such change in power indicators in Egypt 
in order to protect Saudi interests and maintain stability within the Kingdom and across 
the region.  
Regional competition with Qatar 
As a result of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia faced an increased threat of a regional 
competition with Qatar. Qatar has always been looking for an influential regional role 
since the 1990s and tried to achieve that through cultivating media propaganda through 
the government owned satellite channel Al Jazeera. Qatar has tried to mediate regional 
49 
 
political conflicts, and acted as a broker between the West and different Islamist groups, 
most notably its support to the Muslim Brotherhood where several of its leaders took 
refuge in Qatar.
52
 When the waves of the Arab Spring hit the region, Qatar saw an 
opportunity to increase its influence through supporting the protests in other countries 
such in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya. Such Qatari positions towards the Arab Spring, 
through attempting to label itself as a proponent of revolutions against oppression and its 
deployment of diplomatic, financial and media resources to achieve such objective, has 
placed Qatar in a confrontation with Saudi Arabia that favors stability and status quo. 
Despite that both Saudi Arabia and Qatar share the same position of keeping the effect of 
the Arab Spring out of the Gulf region, and the fact that Qatar supported the GCC 
Peninsula Shield forces in Bahrain to bolster the regime of Al Khalifa from collapsing 
along with other GCC states. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia was angered from the position 
of Qatar during the events of the Arab Spring in other countries particularly in Egypt. 
Qatar position to the Arab Spring is backed by several factors; unlike Saudi Arabia, 
domestically Qatar is not threatened by protests since it has a relatively small population 
enjoying economic stability and low unemployment rate. Qatar also maintains long 
standing relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and thus the group does not possess a 
threat to the Qatari regime and give the regime political support; since August 2012 Qatar 
has provided financial assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt 
amounting to $1 billion in grants and $4 billion in Egyptian Central Bank deposits.
53
 In 
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addition, the Shiite population in Qatar is relatively small around 5% to 15% and they are 
well integrated in the Qatari society when compared to Saudi Arabia.
54
  
The Qatari aspirations for a regional role have affected the foreign policy behavior of 
Saudi Arabia since an increase in the role of Qatar will change the regional balance of 
power and affect the position of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi fear of a change in regional 
balance of power in the wake of the Arab Spring is mainly due to the Qatari led support 
to Islamist movements, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood that came to power and 
replaced old autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Saudi Arabia employed its foreign 
policy and used the frame of the GCC again to counter the Qatari agenda through 
offering support to other GCC member countries and maintaining good relations with 
them to form a pro-Saudi front inside the organization. Saudi Arabia attempted also to 
lead a “Gulf Union” post the Arab Spring and to present itself as the leader of the Arab 
states in the Gulf with ambitions to move from the state of cooperation within the GCC to 
the state of union. In regards to the developments in Egypt in summer 2013, Saudi Arabia 
highly supported the military backed government that overthrew the pro-Qatar Muslim 
Brotherhood government in Egypt. With the Muslim Brotherhood losing power in Egypt, 
this has subsequently decreased the influence of Qatar in the region in favor of Saudi 
Arabia. Furthermore, the Saudi regime exported the idea to other GCC states that Qatar is 
intervening in their internal affairs and compromising their stability and security which is 
against the GCC non-interference agreement. As a result in March 2014 Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and United Arab Emirates withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar in a striking 
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dispute within the Arab Gulf countries over the Qatari interference in the internal affairs 
of other member states and its support to the Muslim Brotherhood.
55
 Saudi Arabia has 
successfully mobilized its resources to balance the power of Qatar during the events of 
the Arab Spring and preserved its regional leadership over the Gulf region through 
consolidation of its position in the rapidly changing region. Saudi Arabia was able to take 
a leading position inside the Gulf Cooperation Council leaving no space for Qatar to 
dominate the organization as well as the Saudi positions towards Egypt and other 
regional conflicts has given Saudi Arabia an upper hand in suppressing the Qatari 
competition for a regional role post the Arab Spring.  
Terrorism and the increasing influence of extremist groups  
With the fall of strong autocratic Arab regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen due 
to the Arab Spring, radical Islamist movements and terrorist organizations found it an 
opportunity to increase their power and achieve political gains in the region. Such 
development was perceived by the leaders in Saudi Arabia as threat in some cases while 
it was used to achieve some Saudi political gains in other cases. There is an apparent 
duality in the Saudi perceptions towards the rise of radical Islamist movements in the 
wake of the Arab Spring. Saudi leaders have perceived terrorism in the wake of the Arab 
Spring from several levels with different threatening degrees. Saudi leaders perceived rise 
of terrorism and extremist groups within the Kingdom as a threat like any groups that 
might undermine the survival of the ruling regime. Saudi leaders also perceive terrorist 
organizations like the Islamic State as a threat on the long run to Saudi Arabia with its 
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radical ideology that may challenge the Saudi Wahhabi ideology, compromise the Saudi-
American relations, and undermine the rule of the Al Saud. Saudi leaders have historical 
conflicts with radical groups like the Islamic State. In the late 1920s, the Al Saud ruling 
family was threatened by a radical group of the Wahhabist Ikhwan that revolted against 
the rule of King Abul Al-Aziz ibn Saud. The Ikhwan revolt in Saudi Arabia was later 
suppressed and the Al Saud maintained control over the territory of Saudi Arabia backed 
by the Saudi Wahhabi ideology that gives legitimacy to the Al Saud’s regime. Saudi 
Arabia fears that the rise of radical terrorist groups may undermine the rule to the Al 
Saud’s regime. Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and other terrorist groups view the Al Saud 
rule to be against Islam and that the relations of Saudi Arabia with the West are against 
the interests of the Muslim nation. Obviously, the Saudi-American relation was one of 
the reasons behind calling for jihad (holy war) against the United States by radical 
terrorist groups due to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia since the 1991 Gulf 
war.
56
 
In the context of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has adopted a policy to combat the rise of 
radical terrorist groups like the Islamic State to confront their increasing influence within 
the Kingdom. In addition, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, has called 
for attacks in Saudi Arabia and described Saudi Arabia as the “head of the snake and 
stronghold of disease”,57 which shows that the Islamic State became a direct threat to the 
security and stability of Saudi Arabia and accordingly must be confronted.  In 2014, King 
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Abdullah issued a royal decree criminalizing terrorism and included other actions to be 
described as terrorist acts like “atheism, opposing the rulers in the country, shaking the 
social fabric or national cohesion”.58 Saudi leaders found it an opportunity to issue a 
royal decree that outlaw terrorism as well as any other movements that may pose threats 
to the Al Saud’s regime and the stability of the Kingdom. Saudi leaders are also 
concerned with some Saudi nationals fighting within some terrorist groups in Syria and 
Iraq. The Saudi government is officially discouraging Saudi nationals from joining rebels 
in other countries fearing these Saudi citizens will return to incite radicalized threats to 
the Kingdom’s domestic security, as most of the Saudi terrorist cells in the last two 
decades within the Kingdom were fighting in the Soviet–Afghan War.59   
Regionally, some Saudi leaders perceive the rise of terrorist group such the Islamic State 
(IS) as a powerful tool to fight pro-Iran Shiite groups in Iraq and Syria, and they find that 
some of these radical groups share a strict Salafist ideology similar to the Saudi Wahhabi 
ideology.
60
 This is reason that regionally we find Saudi Arabia not very enthusiastic in 
combating terrorism, especially in Syria and Iraq where these extremist groups cause 
troubles to the Iranian interests there. Saudi Arabia is satisfied with the fact that these 
extremist groups could be a tool to achieve policy goals against the increasing influence 
of pro-Iranian Shiite groups. Saudi Arabia is not necessarily supporting all these groups 
in the region but at the same time it is not very concerned with fighting the presence of 
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these groups in other countries. In Syria, groups like Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham 
that share Salafist ideologies like that of Saudi Arabia take part in fighting the Assad’s 
regime and claim pursuing an Islamic rule based on Salafist principles. There are strong 
evidences that Saudi Arabia supported and armed extremist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra 
to fight against the Syrian regime through using the sectarian card as a tool to present the 
conflict as a Sunni versus Shiite war.
61
  Saudi leaders perceive these extremist groups as 
an instrumental tool to achieve policy goals and effective in fighting pro-Iranian Shiite 
regimes like that of Assad in Syria. 
On the international level, Saudi Arabia offers an image to the west as a country fighting 
terrorism. Post the September 2001 terrorist attacks where fifteen out of the nineteen 
hijackers were Saudi nationals; Saudi Arabia was placed under international pressures to 
confront terrorism as it may affect the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West. 
Following the Riyadh compound bombings in 2003, the Saudi government has started a 
crackdown on radical groups and extremists in Saudi Arabia through mass arrests and 
detentions.
62
 With the rise of the power of Islamic State in the region post the Arab 
Spring, Saudi Arabia was one of the Arab countries that joined the US-led coalition 
conducting airstrikes against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia has also 
initiated a crackdown on IS affiliated groups within the Kingdom after separate incidents 
across the Kingdom. These moves by Saudi Arabia are out of two reasons, firstly to 
preserve the Saudi-American relations and secondly to calm voices accusing Saudi 
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Arabia for supporting extremist groups in countries such as in Syria and Iraq. Saudi 
Arabia has made rhetorical initiatives to combat terrorism and to enhance its image to the 
West. In September 2011, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the Unitized Nations 
and largely funded to create the United Nations Centre for Counter Terrorism (UNCCT) 
later in 2014 King Abdullah donated to the center with $100 million to enhance the 
effectiveness of the centre in combating terrorism.
63
 All these efforts by Saudi Arabia to 
combat terrorism are mainly to preserve the relations with the West and improve the 
image of the Kingdom from accusations of supporting terrorist groups in other countries. 
To sum up, the Saudi positions towards terrorism in the wake of the Arab Spring have 
been characterized of duality. Where Saudi Arabia have aggressively combated terrorism 
within the kingdom and issued a royal decree on counterterrorism, in addition trying to 
preserve the Saudi relations with the west through enhancing the image of the Kingdom 
in fighting terrorism through joining the coalition against the IS and creating the UNCCT. 
On the contrary, there are apparent evidences that Saudi Arabia along with Qatar is 
supporting extremist groups to fight the regime of Bashar Al Assad through arming and 
funding extremist Sunni groups.
64
 Yet with the growing influence and power of extremist 
groups especially the Islamic State, we find rapid alterations in the Saudi positions 
towards these groups which became a threat to the stability and security of Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia has decided to join the US-led coalition airstrikes against the Islamic State 
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and agreed with the United States to support, fund and arm the moderate opposition in 
Syria, so that the Saudi fight against extremist groups in the region would not 
compromise the Saudi interests in taking down the regime of Bashar Al Assad through 
supporting other factions in the Syrian opposition. The threat of terrorism in the wake of 
the Arab Spring signals the importance of the perceptions of the leaders, in which the 
different perception of the same issue could lead to different policy decisions.  
Domestic dissent in Saudi Arabia and the role of domestic groups 
Saudi Arabia has avoided large scale protests in the wake of the Arab Spring despite 
tensions from different domestic groups that are mostly marginalized by the Al Saud’s 
regime. The Al Saud ruling family has succeeded in avoiding threats of internal 
turbulence amid the events of the Arab Spring. Obviously, the ruling regime in Saudi 
Arabia is equipped with effective mechanisms that can be mobilized and used to reduce 
threats from internal unrest and opposition groups, unlike other Arab countries such in 
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria which experienced prolonged unrest causing regime 
change and civil strife. Saudi Arabia did not experience similar turmoil despite the high 
rate of unemployment back in 2011 among Saudi nationals amounting to 10%,
65
 minimal 
political participation and uncertainty about succession of the King. Some calls of an 
Arab Spring themed Facebook page “Day of Rage” was present in Saudi Arabia on social 
media platforms which attracted more than 36,000 people, yet that day set on the 11
th
 of 
March 2011 went quietly and minor protests were crushed by the police. The regime 
made this Day of Rage to look like as attempts by Shiites in the Eastern Province to serve 
                                                          
65
 John Sfakianakis, Daliah Merzaban and Turki A. Al Hugail, ‘Employment Quandary’ Saudi Arabia 
Economics, 16 February 2011. 
 
57 
 
Iran’s interests in the region and disturb the stability of the Kingdom.66 One of the 
reasons that the Saudi youth did not succeed like in Egypt or Tunisia because they have 
almost no influence in the patriarchal Saudi society as well as they are lacking the 
organizational and mobilization means to achieve striking goals.   
The Arab Spring has raised the expectations of several domestic groups in Saudi Arabia 
to demand some rights and reforms like the youth, women and Shiites; moreover it 
created concerns to other groups particularly the clergy who have interest in preserving 
the rule of Al Saud in the Kingdom. However, an authoritarian conservative monarchy as 
Saudi Arabia gives no opportunity for domestic groups to develop clear positions on 
policy issues, since domestic groups in the Kingdom are denied organizational platforms 
that would allow them to propagate policy decisions. Domestic groups within the 
Kingdom are denied as well the necessary level of autonomy to pursue their interests in 
the policy making in an effective way. The Al Saud’s regime has been dealing with 
domestic groups in the country with different actions from repression to appeasement to 
make the concerns from some groups and the demands on the state relevant to the 
particular policy that is on the agenda by the Saudi leaders. The next couple of 
paragraphs present the demands and concerns of some of these domestic groups and how 
the ruling regime dealt with such difference       
In order to comprehend the role of other different influential domestic groups in Saudi 
Arabia and their role during the Arab Spring, it is necessary to understand the state 
formation of Saudi Arabia.  The modern or the third Saudi state was formed in 1932 by 
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Abul Al-Aziz ibn Saud who successfully conquered Riyadh and united the country. The 
formation of such a state required the unification of different tribes present at that time in 
the Arabian Peninsula; such unification was established mainly with the Al Saud’s 
alliance with the Wahhabi clerics who provided religious backing and legitimacy to the 
House of Al Saud to this day.
67
 Another way pursued by King Abul Al-Aziz to remove 
tribal differences was through inter-tribal marriages and that Abul Al-Aziz married 
around 30 tribal marriages to consolidate power into his family.
68
 In addition to the use of 
force by the Al Saud family to conquest and defeat their main rivals, the Rashidis who 
were fighting against each other over control of the country. As illustrated the Al Saud 
family has successfully included with them in the state formation the most influential 
groups at the time of formation of the third Saudi state which are powerful tribes and 
religious Wahhabi clerics “ulama”. This state formation is still present until today 
especially the relationship between the House of Al Saud and the ulama while the 
presence of tribes slightly decreased overtime. 
Several domestic groups had increased presence and demands over time in the Kingdom, 
yet the Al Saud’s regime has always attempted to create state-owned political groups 
including journalists, lawyers’ association and human rights organizations to guarantee 
their loyalty to the ruling regime. King Abduallah has initiated in 2003 the King 
Abdulaziz Center For National Dialogue with selected representatives from several 
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domestic groups mostly intellectuals, clergy, women and youth.
69
 Such initiative was to 
include some groups and to present the Al Saud’s regime as accepting the views of 
different domestic groups, yet these selected representatives pose no challenge to the 
regime and are loyal to the House of Al Saud. Furthermore, the Saudi consultative 
council “Shura” enjoys some decision making authority, yet all its members are 
appointed by the King and it does not represent an actual opposition to the regime. 
However with the development of Arab Spring, King Abduallah has announced that 
women can join the Shura Council and in 2013 women were appointed and joined the 
council for the first time holding 30 seats including two of them from the royal family, in 
an attempt to soothe the increasing demands for women equality. All these were initially 
as attempts to counter dissatisfaction with the regime following calls for protests that 
swept the Kingdom as a result of the Arab Spring in 2011. Yet none of these reforms has 
any direct fundamental contribution to the distribution of power or decision making in 
Saudi Arabia. Generally, women have always enjoyed no political rights since the 
formation of Saudi Arabia. A country that it is established based on extreme Islamic 
foundations that does not allow women the right to vote, to go out alone or even to drive; 
therefore  any decisions by the ruling regime to grant women more rights will be 
countered and opposed by the hardliner Wahhabi clergy, who provide legitimacy to the 
House of Al Saud. Over the history of Saudi Arabia, some significant incidents occurred 
where women decided to take the streets and demand their rights. One of these was in 
November 1991, when approximately 47 Saudi Women demonstrated for the right to 
drive and drove their cars in the streets of Riyadh, yet they were arrested by religious 
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police and the Al Saud’s regime has reasserted the ban on women driving.70 In 2007, 
around 1100 women petitioned to King Abdullah for their right to drive and the 
government has not replied
71
. With the emergence of the Arab Spring, calls for the right 
of women to drive increased and campaigns were initiated, in May 2011 a campaign 
called “Women2Drive” challenged the ban on driving and authorities later detained 
Manal al-Sherif who launched the campaign on Facebook.
72
 Several other campaigns 
calling for the right of women to drive appeared in the following years and the last 
infamous was in October 2013 where several Saudi women challenged the ban and 
posted videos of them driving on YouTube and later the campaign Facebook page was 
blocked by the government.
73
  King Abdullah introduced some changes to the status of 
women in the Kingdom with increasing calls for freedom, in addition to the King’s 
decision to include women in the Shura Council. King Abdullah issued a decree in 
September 2011, soon after the wave of protests that swiped the region, to allow women 
to vote and run as candidates for the municipal elections for the first time in the history of 
Saudi Arabia.
74
 Despite that both the Shura council and the municipal elections have no 
real influential power in the decision making process in Saudi Arabia, yet as a result of 
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the Arab Spring and increased calls for more women’ rights, the King has included 
several improvements to confront increased challenges brought by the Arab Spring.  
Moreover, the Wahhabi clergy or ulama in Saudi Arabia is another domestic group that 
have a strong relationship with the House of Al Saud since the formation of the country, 
when the House of Al Saud had an agreement with the clergy to give the ruling family 
religious legitimacy in return for spreading the Wahhabi belief in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Due to the relationship of mutual interests mainly in maintaining the status quo between 
the royal family and the Wahhabi clergy, both entities have guaranteed the presence of 
each other. In March 2011, Wahhabi clerics have officially denounced public protests and 
“described them as un-Islamic and will result in chaos and threaten the unity of the 
Muslim community”75. Despite historically, the relationship between the religious 
establishment and the ruling royal family was inconstant. When King Abdullah came to 
power, he restructured the religious establishment, fired famous religious figures, limited 
the power of the religious police and banned clerics from issuing fatwas without referring 
to the central authority.
76
 However, this relationship has improved when the regimes in 
Tunisia and Egypt fell down in early 2011 and the wave of protests reached several 
neighboring countries. The Saudi regime reached for the support of the religious 
establishment who responded positively by declaring public dissent as un-Islamic. The 
regime later repaid the clergy for their support with large amount of money and issued a 
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law that criminalize “harming the reputation or dignity of religious officials”.77 The role 
of the religious police reemerged and religious scholars began to dominate the media 
pushing aside other voices especially liberal movements demanding freedom and 
democracy. The ruling regime realized the same conclusion that the Wahhabi religious 
establishments give legitimacy to their rule, their presence is tied with the fate of the 
ruling regime and they are only way to keep other calls for change and Shiite movements 
demanding freedom and equality from emerging. 
Shiites are another domestic group in Saudi Arabia, they consists around 10 to 15 percent 
of the Muslim population in the Kingdom.
78
 Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Saudi 
Arabia has feared the Iranian influence and the rise of political Shiism in the Gulf region. 
Shiites in Saudi Arabia are not allowed to practice their religious rituals publicly, to build 
their own mosques, to hold prominent positions in the government and they face 
oppression from the regime. Shiites in Saudi Arabia have caused some troubles and riots 
especially in the 1980s and 1990s with increased Iranian influence after the Islamic 
Revolution, most notably were the 1979 Qatif uprising and the 1987 Mecca incident 
which ended up with violent crackdown on the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia.  Despite 
that the Shiite radicalism in the Gulf region ended in the 1990s yet Saudi leaders along 
with Wahhabi clerics still portray Shiites in the country as a fifth column for Iran in the 
region who work to achieve Iran’s agenda. The regime in Saudi Arabia has used the 
sectarian Shiism card mainly as a justification to several Saudi policy to name a few: to 
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deflect attention of the public from the performance of the government, to counter 
protests within the Kingdom and to give justification to the Saudi foreign policy 
decisions in other countries through describing the Shiites as tool for Iran in the region.  
For instance, as the regime did with the protests in the Eastern Province and claimed that 
Iran is directly responsible for such protests or blaming the situation in Bahrain and 
Yemen as an Iranian mobilization of Shiite communities in these countries.
79
 However, 
the threat to Saudi Arabia is in fact concerned with the influence of Iran and not the 
Shiites. Historically, the positions of Saudi Arabia towards the Shiites were not that 
aggressive and the Shiism card was used only after the Iranian Revolution to balance the 
power of Iran in the region. In fact, Saudi Arabia maintained good relations with the 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi’s monarchial regime in Iran who was also Shiite. In 
addition Saudi Arabia has supported the Shiite monarchial regime in Yemen against the 
supporters of the Yemen Arab Republic which were supported by the Nasser’s regime in 
Egypt. Such positions asserts that Saudi Arabia has used the card of Shiism in protect the 
status quo in the region towards increased Iranian influence and not out of fear of Shiism 
as a religious sect.  
As for intellectuals in Saudi Arabia, there are neither political parties nor unions allowed 
in the country, and even formal associations require the approval of the government and 
obtaining a license to operate. In 2004, an association for Saudi journalists was 
established as well as other groups announced that they will form similar associations. 
However, all these attempts are controlled by the state and do not possess an actual 
opposition to the government and the intentions for establishing independent entities will 
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be eventually suppressed and criminalized since freedom of political assembly in banned 
by law in the country.
80
  Businessmen, on the other hand, have more to say in country due 
to the fact that they are more relatively organized, their opinions are taken into 
consideration by the royal family, and they are consulted on some important issues like 
tax issues, regulation of foreign investment and labor law in recent years.
81
   
Nevertheless the existing different domestic groups in Saudi Arabia that have different 
agendas, not all of these groups have an effect on the decision makers that formulate 
foreign policy in Saudi Arabia.  Depending on their domestic weight in the country each 
group either have significant or minor role in the foreign policy behavior of the state. 
Most of the demands of the youth, women and Shiite minority were oppressed by force; 
in addition, the government applied the usual policy of rentierism and appeasing them 
through minor changes. While other domestic groups such as the Wahhabi clergy or 
businessmen and technocrats were somehow employed by the regime to benefit the 
country in pursuing a particular foreign policy. The Al Saud’s regime has always used the 
available resources to increase the legitimacy of the regime and reduce the legitimacy of 
other groups through the use of state patronage and rentierism through buying protestors, 
religious authority and use of force.
82
 These mechanisms have been used since the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia to prevent the emergence of strong opposition groups.  
Demands raised by youth, women and Shiites during the course of the Arab Spring were 
characterized as being against Islam and the clergy issued fatwas to support such claims, 
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in other situations such demands by the aforementioned domestic groups were met with 
repressive use of force from the government. Rentierism is a mechanism applied by the 
ruling regime to either to buy protestors from revolting or to buy the loyalty of other 
domestic groups such as the clergy, the businessmen and technocrats whom their 
existence and relationship with the regime is characterized by being of common interests 
and mutual benefits. King Abdullah offered in March 2011 a financial package of $36 
billion and to be followed by another $94 billion in the following year, this welfare plan 
was intended to soothe the effect of the Arab Spring in the Kingdom through combining 
economic with political aspirations. Also such rentier policy has proved effective in 
maintaining “ties with the Wahhabi ulama, powerful tribes, and prominent businessmen 
that remain important in ensuring stability within Saudi Arabia”. 83 
According to Neoclassical Realism, systemic pressures affect the internal composition of 
different domestic groups. For instance; youth, women and Shiite minority saw in the 
Arab Spring an opportunity to demand their rights and alternatively the government 
perceived the effect of the Arab Spring on these groups as a threat which made the 
regime to adopt specific policies to accommodate such threat with using money to buy 
off these groups on one hand and oppress protests on the other hand. On the foreign 
policy level, the regime maintained a policy to protect its interests where it did not 
support and even condemned similar calls in other Arab countries for the youth, women 
and Shiites. Moreover, Saudi Arabia supported the opposition in Syria against the 
Assad’s regime that is supported by pro-Shiite Iran, while intervening militarily through 
the GCC Peninsula Shield Force against the Shiite dominated protests in Bahrain.  
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Since the Al Saud, Wahhabi clergy and businessmen have a relationship of mutual 
interests; the regime slightly depends on them to formulate its foreign policy. Saudi 
Wahhabi clergy, businessmen and technocrats along with the Al Saud’s regime perceived 
the Arab Spring as a threat to their existence. In fact, the clergy share actual power with 
the regime and have influential role in policymaking throughout the history of Saudi 
Arabia most notably their role in approving the government decision for the 1973 oil 
embargo,
84
 legitimizing through a fatwa the 2002 peace initiative with Israel and 
prohibiting revolting against the rulers in 2011. Businessmen and technocrats have 
increased influence the Saudi policymaking in the recent years especially with the rise of 
Saudi Arabia as an economic power and joining the World Trade Organization in 2005, 
where negotiations were carried out by Saudi businessmen and technocrats rather than 
government officials.
85
 Obviously, Saudi Arabia has the ability to mobilize the resources 
of effective domestic groups like the clergy, businessmen, and technocrats to serve its 
own interests which is one of the important characteristics of a state and when these 
interests collide between different domestic groups thus conflict is inevitable. Moreover, 
a systemic pressure, in this case is the Arab Spring, shape domestic processes within 
Saudi Arabia which limit the state’s ability to respond to systemic imperatives.86 For 
instance, the Arab Spring has affected all different interests groups in Saudi Arabia and 
each acted in a different way to serve their own interests evolving generally around 
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survival; by turn such changes have limited the options available to Saudi Arabia and 
obliged the state to pursue a specific foreign policy that helps to protect the state’s 
interests in the most effective way.   
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CHAPTER III 
The Capabilities of Saudi Arabia that help in formulating its Policy 
Neoclassical Realism argues that the foreign policy of a country is affected by the 
different resources allocated to it and the ability to mobilize these resources is what 
determines the foreign policy behavior of states. The foreign policy choices depend on 
the perceptions of relative power and the allocation of national resources to foreign 
policy to ultimately pursue state’s national interests.87 Neoclassical Realism claims that 
when a country is faced with an external threat, it employs its capabilities whether 
military, geographic, economic and religious to protect its national interests especially its 
security. The effective usage of these capabilities depends on the realization of the 
leaders in a specific country of the different threats which confirms the importance of 
internal factors within a country in explaining its foreign policy behavior. Saudi Arabia 
has at its disposal several capabilities that it can be effectively mobilized to pursue a 
foreign policy serving the Saudi objectives. These resources were extensively used 
throughout the history of Saudi Arabia and especially to balance the threats that appeared 
with the emergence of the Arab Spring. For Neoclassical Realists, a powerful government 
should not only have enough resources but also the ability to extract these resources and 
to use them to deal with external threats. In addition, when there are no threats imposed 
from the systemic level to the state, these resources are used to ensure long term security 
for that country. Saudi Arabia has several capabilities that are used to achieve its interests 
and to face threats including economic capability, military capability, geographic 
capability, and religious capability.  Lastly, through analyzing the capabilities of Saudi 
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Arabia will be able to understand how a conservative status quo power like Saudi Arabia 
served its objectives in a revolutionary environment. In the previous chapter, the thesis 
has offered an explanation on how Saudi Arabia perceived the threats stemming from the 
Arab Spring. Through offering an analysis of the capabilities of Saudi Arabia in this 
chapter and whether the Kingdom succeeded or not in mobilizing these domestic factors 
to serve its national interests and help in formulating in foreign policy, it will be easy to 
understand how Saudi Arabia was able to achieve its objectives in such a revolutionary 
environment.     
Economic Capability 
The economy of Saudi Arabia is one of the strongest economies in the world that is based 
mainly on natural resources where Saudi Arabia possesses 18% of the world’s oil 
reserves. The economic capability of Saudi Arabia is mainly based of being the largest 
crude oil exporter in the world,
88
 which gave the Saudi regime the ability to use such 
valuable resource in directing its foreign policy and the usage of this capability is clearly 
noticeable in the Saudi reactions toward the Arab Spring. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is 
one of the major fastest growing economies and a member of the G-20, the Saudi revenue 
rose dramatically in short time span from $39 billion in 1998 to $153 billion in 2005.
89
 
Economic capability is one of the two pillars of the Saudi foreign policy, the other being 
its religious significance,
90
 which both were used to bolster the position of Saudi Arabia 
in the international system and to ensure its security. Oil based economy of Saudi Arabia 
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has formed that rentier state that bought legitimacy to the Al Saud’s regime domestically 
and helped Saudi Arabia to influence events and enhance its position in other countries 
through economic aid given to them, where Saudi Arabia uses a substantial percentage of 
its national revenues generated mainly from oil income to implement its policies.  
However, the regime is facing some economic challenges including a high 
unemployment rate especially between youth, who first lit the spark of the Arab Spring 
revolts in the region, in addition being one of the fastest growing populations which need 
strong governmental strategies to meet the increasing demand of the people. Saudi Arabia 
recognizes that its economic capability is highly based on its oil wealth and due to the 
scarcity of such resource that if depleted will affect the position of Saudi Arabia in the 
international system. The foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia reflects an 
understanding of the need to expand and diversify the sources of national income, so that 
it does not remain completely dependent on oil income.
91
 Saudi Arabia has successfully 
restructured its economic policies to diversify its production in other sectors and decrease 
its dependence on oil through encouraging the private sector and attempts to diversify its 
foreign investments which materialized in Saudi Arabia joining World Trade 
Organization in 2005 among other world’s great economies.          
Saudi Arabia has been successfully capable to extract and mobilize its economic 
resources to deal with internal and external threats that emerged with the Arab Spring. As 
previously mentioned the Arab Spring imposed the threat of turmoil in Saudi Arabia like 
other Arab countries, accordingly the Al Saud’s regime used the policy of rentierism and 
offered billion of dollars to reduce the probability of dissent and to prevent economic 
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discontent within the country from triggering protests. Since the oil production is owned 
by the government and controlled by members of the ruling family, this means that the Al 
Saud’s regime has access to large sums of money at their disposal which can be used to 
placate the citizens. The Al Saud’s regime has also maintained a strong and steady 
relationship with the Saudi businessmen who further enhance the legitimacy of the Al 
Saud’s regime as they are benefiting from the Al Saud’s economic policy of 
encouragement of the private sector and free market mechanisms, as they will not be in 
favor and will resist any changes in the Al Saud’s regime or threats to its existence since 
they maintain a relationship of mutual benefits. This economic structure of Saudi Arabia 
has given the government the ability to mobilize domestic groups like Saudi businessmen 
to resist any challenges from the Arab Spring that may threat the regime of the Al Saud.  
A similar policy has been implemented by Saudi Arabia on the regional level in countries 
that experienced revolts and regime change as a consequence of the Arab Spring, Saudi 
Arabia has offered billions in financial aid to countries to bolster the Saudi influence in 
these countries that experienced a regime change such as in Egypt, where Saudi Arabia 
has offered a financial aid amounting $4 billion to the Egyptian government under the 
rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF),
 92
 and $3.25 billion to prop up 
Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s regime in Yemen post GCC the transition of power initiative 
sponsored by Saudi Arabia.
93
 Saudi Arabia also pumped financial packages to strengthen 
allied regimes against potential protests to avoid their collapse from public dissents such 
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in Bahrain and Oman where the Saudi Arabia through the frame of the GCC has pledged 
$20 billion in 2011.
94
 Saudi Arabia has also used its economic capability to fund and train 
the opposition against the rival regime of  Bashar Al Assad in Syria
95
 to gain advantages 
in taking down an unfriendly regime and to  increase the Saudi influence in post Assad’s 
Syria.  
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has always used oil as a weapon to influence events and affect 
international conflicts historically and towards the Arab Spring. Most notably was the 
1973 oil embargo that Saudi Arabia imposed through the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) against Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the United States for their involvement in the 1973 October War in support 
of Israel, such foreign policy decision implemented by Saudi Arabia has caused an 
energy crisis and increased oil prices worldwide.
96
 Subsequently, Saudi Arabia used the 
oil tool in further conflicts and against rival countries; for instance, between 1985 and 
1986 as a response to an Iranian attack on Al-Faw Iraqi port, Saudi Arabia has flooded 
the international market with increased oil production causing the oil prices to 
dramatically fall which highly damaged the Iranian economy as its decreased the Iranian 
revenues in a time of extensive military expenditure for Iran during the time of war.
97
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Saudi Arabia applied this policy again during the Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011, as 
a repercussion of the Arab Spring, to punish Iran and Russia for their support to the 
Assad’s regime, as the Saudi regime has refused to cut its production of oil to drive the 
prices up which negatively affected the economies of Iran and Russia who are already 
facing economic sanctions from the West and oil is considered a vital source to stabilize 
their economy.
98
 These examples show broad usage of the economic capability of the 
Kingdom in implementing its foreign policy. The foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia 
throughout its history and towards the Arab Spring has witnessed a strong ability to 
mobilize the country’s economic capabilities in favor for implementing a foreign policy 
that serves its national interests and most importantly its security whether domestically or 
regionally against systemic threats. Saudi Arabia is also restructuring its economic 
capability in order not to be highly dependent on oil income to protect its regional 
presence in the future and guarantee the state’s ability to protect its national interests 
against current and potential threats.  
Religious Capability  
Since Saudi Arabia has been established on religious basis, King Abdul Al Aziz has 
established Saudi Arabia depending on religious support and legitimacy from the clergy. 
Saudi Arabia was established as an Islamic country with no constitution available since 
the Qur’an is considered the Kingdom’s constitution and the sole source of laws and 
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regulations is Sharia Islamic laws.
99
 The King of Saudi Arabia is referred to as the 
custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and Islam in considered more as a way of life in the 
Kingdom and not only a religion, thus the influence of the religious establishment and the 
ulama is significant in several aspects of life in Saudi Arabia. The ulama in Saudi Arabia 
are the clergy following the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam which traces its origin to 
Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab who initiated a religious reform movement that was 
endorsed by the House of Al Saud who gave Wahhabi clergy political support and the 
clergy on their part gave the Al Saud religious support and legitimacy to their rule of the 
Arabian Peninsula.
100
 The ulama in Saudi Arabia have also a vital role in shaping the 
social values, judging legal issues and decide political priorities.
101
 The ulama have also 
strong presence over important government institutions other than the religious 
establishment such as the ministries of education, justice, pilgrimage affairs and the 
religious police where they have strong influence in the decision making in these 
institutions.
102
 The Saudi regime was able to win the loyalty of religious institutions 
throughout the ages and limit their influence in the domestic and foreign politics for the 
favor of the regime. Due to the relationship of mutual benefits between the House of Al 
Saud and the ulama both have ensured the survival of each other as the ulama and 
religious clerics relied of the Al Saud for protection and funding, in return the House of 
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Al Saud depends on the religious clergy to transcend threats that compromise their 
legitimacy.  
In context of the Arab Spring, the regime in Saudi Arabia succeeded in manipulating the 
religious institutions and utilizing religion to justify its actions and pursue its goals; for 
instance, the Al Saud’s regime has pressured the ulama to issue an Islamic jurisprudence 
“fatwa” prohibiting revolts against the ruler in order to protect the regime survival, in 
contrast the royal decree issued in March 2011 that promised financial welfare programs, 
has also ordered the media organizations in the Kingdom to refrain from criticizing the 
religious leaders to reciprocate the position taken by the clergy towards the Arab Spring.  
Moreover, the position of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world as the birthplace of Islam 
and the guardian of the two holiest cities in Islam has given the Kingdom an advantage 
and respect among other Muslim and Arab countries and it is perceived as the protector 
of Sunni Islam, the birthplace of Islam, and a counter to Shiite Islam that is sponsored by 
Iran. Saudi Arabia since its establishment has been fighting Shiite Islam through the ultra 
conservative Wahhabi ideology; the Al Saud’s regime banned Shiites from practicing the 
religious creed and demolished their mosques when the Shiite populated town of Al Hasa 
was conquered by the Al Saud in 1913.
103
 This oppression against Shiites increased post 
the 1979 Iranian Revolution with its leader Ayatollah Khomeini describing the Al Saud’s 
regime as a corrupt dictatorship and that the holy sites in Saudi cities of Medina and 
Mecca should not be under the control of a single country.
104
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Subsequent to the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has used the propaganda of its position as 
protector of the Sunni doctrine to counter Iranian influence in the region, through 
portraying Iran as a state seeking to spread Shiism in Muslim countries. Additionally, 
Saudi Arabia has portrayed the protests within the Kingdom and in other Arab countries 
such as Bahrain and Yemen as attempts to provoke dissent from the Shiite population to 
increase the Iranian influence. The importance of religion in the politics of Saudi Arabia 
is also obvious in the context of the Arab Spring, is that when the Muslim Brotherhood 
came to power in Egypt following the 25
th
 of January Revolution, which posed a threat to 
the Saudi regime since such political-religious organization could be seen in Saudi Arabia 
and the Muslim World as an alternative to the Saudi Wahhabi doctrine that has given 
legitimacy to the Al Saud’s regime throughout history, as well as due to that Saudi Arabia 
fears of the Muslim Brotherhood rapprochement policy towards Iran.
105
  Saudi Arabia 
has also used religion to guarantee its supremacy over the Muslim world and to counter 
any rising ideology from expanding in the region through establishing and funding pan-
Islamic organizations like the Muslim World League and Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation, where their headquarters are in Saudi Arabia, to lobby the Saudi interests 
against historical threats like Nasserism and Baathism
106
 or current threats resulting from 
the Arab Spring.  
Saudi Arabia clearly benefits from combining religion with politics which has given the 
Saudi regime legitimacy in pursuing its foreign policy and its ability to mobilize the 
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country’s religious institutions to serve its national interests. This is yet another example 
of how the Kingdom used religious clergy to justify the measures and policies taken by 
the state towards the Arab Spring. In Syria, Saudi Arabia was able to mobilize its 
religious capability against the Assad’s regime in Syria where some Saudi clerics issued 
fatwas calling for jihad (a holy war) against the Syrian regime and even justifying killing 
Bashar Al Assad.
107
 Lastly, Religion gives Saudi Arabia a leading role and strong voice 
between the Islamic and Arab countries towards systemic events and the ability to 
enhance the regime legitimacy, lessening domestic discontent, countering ideologies and 
movements threatening the regime’s stability, in addition to enhancing the position of 
Saudi Arabia internationally.  
Military Capability 
The armed forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are one of the strongest and well 
equipped militaries in the region.
108
 Saudi Arabia has been able to create modern and 
effective military forces dependent mainly of western weaponry. According to the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, the defense budget of Saudi Arabia in 2014 
comes in the third place with $80.8 billion just after the United States and China, while 
Russia’s defense budget has fallen below that of Saudi Arabia when compared to the 
2013 top 15 official defense budgets around the world.
 109
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The military of Saudi Arabia is offering security and stability not only to Saudi Arabia 
but also to smaller Gulf states making it significant to the security of “some 60% of the 
world’s oil reserves and over 35% of its gas”.110 Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia has been 
highly dependent on military assistance from the United States based on the special 
relationship of mutual benefits of oil for security that the US-Saudi relations have been 
built upon for decades.
111
 This was evident when Iraq invaded neighboring Kuwait in 
1990; Saudi Arabia has immediately called for the deployment of US troops to deter any 
aggression from Iraq towards the Kingdom. However, with the threats that faced Saudi 
Arabia as a result of the Arab Spring asking for American assistance was not feasible as 
such action by the United States will be against the American values since the United 
States have already made its position in supporting peaceful demonstrations calling for 
regime change and reforms in the Arab World. Thus, when Bahrain was threatened by 
revolts calling for the step down of Al Khalifa’s regime, Saudi Arabia intervened 
militarily through the GCC Peninsula Shield Force without waiting for American 
assistance; worth mentioning that the United States turned its back to the action taken by 
Saudi Arabia in Bahrain due to two main reasons.
112
 Firstly to respect the US-Saudi 
agreement of oil for security since if criticized this will affect the relationship between 
the two countries, and secondly due to the presence of the command of the US Fifth Fleet 
in Bahrain and a regime change especially in favor of pro-Iranian Shiite Bahraini 
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population will threaten the presence of the United States in the Arabian Gulf. 
Furthermore, as the situation is Syria developed with extended civil war between the 
Syrian regime and the opposition, Saudi Arabia has employed its military capability and 
has pledged to arm and train the Syrian rebels in order to be able defeat the Assad’s 
regime.
113
 The ability of Saudi Arabia in in utilizing its military capability towards the 
Syrian conflict is an obvious action of employing internal factors within the Kingdom. 
Saudi Arabia has successfully mobilized its military capability to bring desired outcomes 
in favor of the Saudi interests through bringing an end to a pro-Iranian regime in the 
region; and keeping Iran pre-occupied with the situation in Syria while deflecting its 
attentions from the Gulf region. 
Saudi Arabia has always been able to mobilize its military capability to serve its foreign 
policy due to that fact the army is controlled by members from the Al Saud family not 
only in top military ranks but also in lower ranks to ensure that any action involving the 
military will not be met with rejection and to avoid military coups against the regime 
especially in a region that has a history of military coups in other Arab countries.
114
 The 
political position of the Saudi Minister of Defense has been always held by one of the 
sons or grandsons of King Abdul Al Aziz, the founder to Saudi Arabia, in order to ensure 
the loyalty of the military to the Al Saud ruling family. Another strategy implemented by 
the Al Saud’s regime to avoid the occurrence of military coups and to ensure the loyalty 
of the military to any decisions taken by the ruling family, is that the government 
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maintains other military forces that are autonomous from the armed forces such the 
National Guard, Frontier Guard and the Coast Guard such approach has been labeled as 
coup-proofing strategy that ensures the legitimacy of the regime through force. Saudi 
Arabia ability and control over the army has provided the country with the capacity to 
pursue its foreign policy freely without the fear of division in the military over specific 
decisions or coup attempts within its armed forces during the events of the Arab Spring. 
Notably, when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Bahrain, its role to the Shiite 
insurgency in Yemen, and any other decisions taken by the ruling family, there were no 
signs of dissatisfaction or opposition within the Saudi armed forces about these decisions, 
but a complete support to the regime.   
Geographic Capability 
The geographic location of the Kingdom plays a vital role in the formation of the Saudi 
foreign policy, it was used to achieve and serve the national interests of Saudi Arabia in 
general and towards the Arab Spring in particular. Saudi Arabia is one of the largest Arab 
countries in the Arab World and the largest in the Arabian Peninsula with an area size 
around 2 million km
2
 and occupying most of the Arabian Peninsula, access to two 
important coastlines on the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf,
115
 and it is at the crossroads 
between Asia and Africa. Saudi Arabia is surrounded by several Arab countries including 
Oman, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan each with 
differing degrees of stability, capabilities and different ruling systems.
116
 Saudi Arabia is 
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the only Arab country to have so many borders which gives Saudi Arabia influence and 
access to these countries, as well as more vulnerability to be affected by political 
developments in its border countries. Such argument is apparent in the position of Saudi 
Arabia and its interference towards developments in these countries in the wake of the 
Arab Spring. Developments in Yemen and the Saudi-led initiative to transfer powers of 
Ali Abdullah Saleh to his vice president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to avoid such border 
country to fall into chaos, in addition the position of Saudi Arabia towards Qatar for their 
support to the Muslim Brotherhood are obvious examples of the effect of developments 
in these border countries to the security and stability of Saudi Arabia. 
Being at the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is surrounded mostly by Arab 
rich monarchies where the Kingdom stands as a regional leader of monarchial regimes 
not only in the Gulf region but throughout the Arab World. Since the security of the Gulf 
region is vital to the Kingdom, Saudi Arabia is trying to protect the existence of the Arab 
monarchial regimes. Amid the turmoil brought by the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia 
extended an invitation to Morocco and Jordan to join the GCC to form a strategic 
regional realignment where if they joined the organization,
117
 the organization will be 
including all Arab monarchial regimes. Saudi Arabia has used the framework of the GCC 
to achieve its interests by confronting the Iranian influence which is the reason of 
creating the GCC in 1981 as a regional entity of the oil rich Gulf countries. As a result of 
the threats emanating from the Arab Spring, GCC countries under the sponsorship of 
Saudi Arabia were examining including the only two monarchies outside the 
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organization, despite not considered as Gulf countries, in order to preserve the stability of 
the Arab monarchial regimes with the growing turmoil in the region.   
Saudi Arabia is a part of several concurrent geographic spheres between the Gulf region, 
Arab World, Islamic countries and the rest of the world. Saudi Arabia uses its access to 
these different geographic spheres to achieve certain policy goals.  One geographic 
sphere is the Gulf which Saudi Arabia considers it an important component of Saudi 
foreign policy, Saudi Arabia regards the Gulf security as part of its own and the Gulf 
states have the right to defend their security and independence, which was obvious in the 
course of the Arab Spring when the GCC intervened militarily in Bahrain to confront 
threats and protect the stability of the monarchial regime of Al Khalifa. Another 
geographic sphere of influence to Saudi Arabia is the Arab world where the Kingdom is 
considered to be the homeland of all Arabs and claims directing its foreign policy 
towards Arab solidarity, despite the Saudi position shows that its foreign policy is not 
highly committed to this claim. Saudi Arabia has been calling for Arab unified stance 
towards different issues and Arab solidarity among the Arab League member states. 
Saudi Arabia has been taken a leading role to some pressing Arab issues, for instance 
Saudi Arabia is a strong backer to Palestine which through different Saudi initiatives to 
resolve the Palestinian issue such as the Fahd Plan in 1981 and the peace initiative in 
2002. The Palestinian issue remains at the core of the Saudi foreign policy to guarantee 
its leadership in the Arab World, since it is the main regional issue that the foreign policy 
of most Arab countries pursuing a leading role are concerned with.  
Saudi Arabia has used its position in the Arab World to achieve its interests during the 
events of the Arab Spring, most notably in the Arab League, where Saudi Arabia has a 
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vital role in forming “regional political support for external intervention against the Al 
Qaddafi’s regime.”118 Saudi Arabia has been a supporter for imposing a no fly zone in 
Libya which led to the fall of the Al Qaddafi’s regime, an advocate for suspending the 
membership of Syria under Assad, and the recognition of the Arab League of the Syrian 
National Council as the official representative of the Syrian people. Third geographic 
sphere is the Islamic world, which contributes to the foreign policy of the Saudi Arabia 
through achieving an Islamic unity and solidarity under belonging to one faith, being a 
country that holds most important cities in Islam, this requires the Kingdom to “expand 
its foreign policy reach into a larger presence to include all the Muslim umma”.119 
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia is key player in the Islamic governmental and non-
governmental organizations most notably are the Muslims World League, the 
Organization of Islamic Conference where Saudi Arabia is the headquarters of both of 
them. Saudi Arabia has always been a provider for moral and material support to Islamic 
countries. Saudi Arabia uses pure religious rhetoric through its pro-Al Saud religious 
clergy to denounce Arab revolts and forbid to revolt against the rulers in an attempt to 
influence the Muslim populations in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries and to 
hold back the spread of Arab Spring in other countries. Final sphere of influence is the 
international sphere where Saudi Arabia is implementing its foreign policy through 
establishing relations with major powers that share interests with the Kingdom. In 
addition to the Saudi role in international organizations such as the United Nations, as the 
Kingdom uses its international weight to defend its policy interests and endorse the Arab 
                                                          
118 Benedetta Berti and Yoel Guzansky, "Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy on Iran and the Proxy War in 
Syria: Toward a New Chapter?" Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs III, no. 3 (2014): 26. 
119
 Alan Munro, "The Dilemma for Saudi Foreign Policy." The RUSI Journal, 2008, 46. 
84 
 
and Islamic issues in the international arena. Saudi Arabia’s importance in the 
international arena is due to its regional and economic importance; Saudi Arabia used its 
position in the international arena in supporting the United Nations Security Council 
resolution and NATO to intervene in Libya in 2011 to overthrow the Al Qaddafi’s 
regime, and pressured the international community to intervene against the Assad’s 
regime in Syria. Saudi Arabia also signaled a shift that it is obvious in the documents 
used for the content analysis in its position to the conflict in Syria from condemning the 
regime in early phases of the conflict to asking for an international intervention against 
Syria and accusing the Syrian regime for using chemical weapons against the Syrian 
people. Another Saudi position in the international circle is its reaction to the overthrow 
of Mohamed Morsi’s regime in Egypt and backing the new government in Egypt 
economically and politically and blaming the West especially the United States for “their 
ignorance towards the crisis in Egypt” and not supporting the post Morsi’s regime in 
Egypt.
120
  
Ultimately, Saudi Arabia was able to mobilize its geographic capability and has 
employed its position as part of the Gulf region, the Arab, Muslim worlds and the 
international community to serve its national interests during the unrest caused by Arab 
Spring. Obviously, Saudi Arabia used its position in the Gulf to ensure the stability of 
Bahraini regime of Al Khalifa against increasing protests to his rule, as well as providing 
support to the monarchial regimes across the Arab World as a whole through extending 
an invitation to Jordan and Morocco, the only two monarchies outside of the GCC. In 
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addition to the utilization of its status as home of Arabs and the origin of Islam to roll 
back the Iranian influence through portraying it as a threat to the Arabs’ existence and as 
an increase of political Shiism in the region; and using its position in the international 
community to achieve its objectives through condemning regimes in Libya and Syria, 
while supporting post- Morsi’s regime in Egypt in the international arena. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
Policy outcome of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring 
Historically Saudi Arabia as a status quo power, has largely avoided having an explicit 
role towards conflicts in the region as long as these conflicts are addressed by other 
countries. However, this position has begun to slightly change with the suspension of the 
membership of Egypt from the Arab League over its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, 
Saudi Arabia appears to have a leading role to restore the balance in the region and 
address conflicts in the region. After Egypt was ousted from the Arab League over its 
peace treaty with Israel, Saudi Arabia in order to fill the balance vacuum in solving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, offered in 1981 what is known as the Fahd Plan and later pushed for 
a similar initiative in the Arab League summit in Fez in 1982 to give Palestinians an 
independent state in return for an implicit recognition of Israel.
121
 With the outbreak of 
the Arab Spring, there were doubts in Saudi Arabia about whether the United States is 
still committed to defend their allies in the region against domestic dissent. Saudi leaders 
were angered from the position of the United States towards Egypt and believed that it 
should have supported the Mubarak’s regime. The reason behind the American position 
towards the events of the Arab Spring was mainly due to the concept of values versus 
interests; despite the American interests in the region were to maintain alliance with 
strong regional countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia yet the American values were 
concerned with supporting the people demands for freedom and democracy. Additionally, 
the American security commitment to its allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, is 
mainly over protecting these allies from external threats, while the events of the Arab 
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Spring were characterized by domestic dissent and no direct signs of aggression from 
other countries. These developments have constrained the United States from delivering 
its security commitment to their allies in the region, consequently Saudi Arabia began to 
have doubts about the long security assurance that the American-Saudi relations have 
been based upon for decades. However, since the events of the Arab Spring undermine 
the security of Saudi Arabia; accordingly Saudi Arabia has tried to play by the American 
rules of the game through supporting the people’s demands in Libya and Syria in an 
attempt to engage the United States in the conflict in Syria. However, such attempt failed 
in engaging the United Sates in having a direct intervening role against the Assad’s 
regime in Syria, which has placed Saudi Arabia to pursue its objectives and protect its 
security by its own without depending on the American security commitment.  
Subsequently, the threats that Saudi Arabia faced as a result of the Arab Spring has 
forced the Kingdom to have a central role in the region. With the collapse of strong Arab 
regimes, the breakup of the Sunni Axis with the overthrow of the Mubarak’s regime in 
Egypt, and the inability of the United States to maintain its security commitment to Saudi 
Arabia; these developments have forced Saudi Arabia to made adjustments to its foreign 
policy to confront the increasing threats from the Arab Spring. The first adjustment 
included investing more in their foreign policy, where Saudi Arabia has applied 
rentierism policy to avoid domestic dissent and offered billion of dollars in aid to other 
countries to bolster pro Saudi regimes and to maintain influence with newly formed 
regimes post revolts. The second adjustment in Saudi foreign policy is the increased 
change in the position of Saudi Arabia from low to high profile in regional controversies. 
Such change in Saudi position is apparent in the documents used in the content analysis 
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where the reaction of Saudi Arabia towards regional controversies shows more 
assertiveness. On one hand, the documents published in the four years before the Arab 
Spring discuss issues like working towards Arab solidarity, countering terrorism, fighting 
poverty, establishing an Arab trade zone, calling for reconsidering amending the 
constitution of Iraq and condemning intervention in Iraq internal affairs without referring 
to a specific country. On the other hand, documents published since the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring shows increased assertiveness towards regional controversies to name a few: 
calling to move from the state of cooperation to state of union in the GCC, accusing the 
Syrian regime of war crimes and asking for external intervention on the side of the 
opposition, examining including Jordan and Morocco in the GCC, having an explicit 
position towards domestic changes in countries like Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain and 
Libya. The Saudi reactions towards threats cultivated from the Arab Spring show higher 
assertiveness in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia post the Arab Spring. 
The data analyzed in the content analysis shows this change in the Saudi foreign policy, 
the documents used were divided into two time frames before and after the Arab Spring. 
The documents published by the Saudi ministry of foreign affairs post the Arab Spring 
shows more assertiveness in terms of the speaker’s tone, where this tone is more assertive 
when compared to documents published before the Arab Spring.  The results in chart 3 
show a considerable increase in the level of assertiveness in the speaker’s tone in the 
documents amounting from 42% before the Arab Spring to 84.2% after the Arab Spring. 
As for the friendly tone of the speaker, it was 29% before the Arab Spring and 15.8% 
after the Arab Spring. This data indicates that there is an obvious change in the Saudi 
foreign policy as a result of the Arab Spring, whether there is more assertiveness in 
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conducting its foreign policy when compared to the documents before the Arab Spring. 
The data has shown also that there is some sort of association between the speaker’s tone 
ranging from friendly to assertive and the period selected which is visible in the Chi-
Square measuring the dependence between the two variables as presented in table 2. This 
analysis of assertiveness of Saudi foreign policy shows some ordinal patterns where there 
is an increase from friendly to assertive policies over the period from 2008 to 2014; this 
is visible in the Gamma measurement of ordinal data as stated in table 3 with a value of 
.625 which is very strong.  
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Saudi Arabia has implemented its foreign policy in the region to serve its national 
interests and most importantly to ensure its security whether internally or internationally. 
The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring despite it seems 
contradictory in dealing with the Arab revolts in different countries, but it was marked by 
some obvious characteristics like preservation of the status quo, balance of power in the 
region and containment, and power and opportunity. These three characteristics outline 
the structure of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia in general and towards the Arab Spring 
particularly based on how Saudi Arabia perceived the threats emerging from the Arab 
Spring and how the Kingdom used the capabilities it had at its disposal to formulate its 
foreign policy.   
Preservation of the status quo 
The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring has been characterized by 
the attempts to maintain the status quo especially internally against probability of protests 
within the Kingdom or externally in Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt. The term status quo 
refers to the existing state of affairs; the status quo to Saudi Arabia is defined as the 
preservation of the current Saudi security and stability in addition to confronting any 
threats challenging the status quo of monarchial rule in other countries in the region or 
the existence of regimes allied to the Kingdom. Maintaining the status quo is one of the 
most important pillars of the Saudi foreign policy since its creation, as whenever the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is faced with a new systemic development that might upset the 
already established order, Saudi Arabia appears fighting fiercely such development 
through formulating its foreign policy in order to protect its national interests represented 
in its stability and security. Saudi Arabia has always adopted a pro-status quo foreign 
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policy with the aim to preserve the state’s current position and prevent changes that could 
lead to the collapse of its political system.
122
 Saudi Arabia employs a pro-status quo 
policy the protect the Al Saud family control over the country that its ruling system is an 
absolute monarchy supported by religious Wahhabi interpretation of Islam, Saudi Arabia 
applies pro-status quo policy to face threats challenges either the security of the ruling 
regime or the Wahhabi ideology internally and externally.  Such policy is achieved 
through the consolidation of power in the hands of the rulers and that the citizens largely 
are in harmony with this prevailing political identity, with the exception to some small 
groups like the Shiite minority in the Eastern Province who have no effective influence in 
the country and are repressed by the regime out of fear that they would work as 
proponents of Iran in the Kingdom.
123
 Externally, Saudi Arabia has used its pro-status 
quo policy also to ensure its security, when Saudi Arabia was faced with the threat of the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Kingdom has pursued a foreign policy strategy to 
preserve the status quo in the region through the formation of the GCC to bring all oil-
rich Gulf monarchies together to face such threat that undermines the stability of the 
Arabian Gulf. Additionally with the spread of the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia has 
endorsed its pro-status quo policy by using its oil wealth to protect the security of Saudi 
Arabia from challenges threatening the pre-established order in the region. Saudi Arabia 
applied such policy towards the Arab Spring to protect security and stability of Arab 
monarchial regimes from collapsing through pumping billion of dollars in aid to other 
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monarchies outside the GCC like Jordan and Morocco
124
, and supporting the regime in 
Bahrain financially and militarily against protests challenging Al Khalifa’s monarchial 
regime. In Egypt and Yemen, Saudi Arabia also offered financial aid and supported 
specific entities to shape the political outcome in these countries post the regime changes 
due to the Arab Spring. In Egypt after the step down of Mubarak’s regime, Saudi Arabia 
financially supported the interim SCAF rule and the new militarily backed government 
after the removal of Mohamed Morsi with billions of dollars in aid. In Yemen, Saudi 
Arabia pursued its pro status quo policy, where it offered financial aid and sponsored a 
transition plan to hand the power of Ali Abdullah Saleh to his vice president Abd Rabbu 
Mansour Hadi to ensure the security and stability in the region and avoid the fall of 
Yemen into the hands of other factions especially the Houthis who are considered pro 
Iran. 
Despite the interest of Saudi Arabia to maintain the status quo in the region, the Saudi 
position to the Arab Spring revolutions in both Libya and Syria in favor of the opposition 
reflects a contrary position concerning the Saudi policy in maintaining the status quo. 
Accordingly, it can be seen from these Saudi stances toward Libya and Syria that the 
policy of maintaining the status quo applies only to friendly countries where the ruling 
regimes are in support of the interests of Saudi Arabia as is the case of Egypt, Yemen and 
Bahrain. While in rival countries such as Libya and Syria, where the Qaddafi’s regime 
was publicly criticizing the Al Saud’s regime125, and in Syria that has long history of 
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tension with Al Saud’s regime, Saudi Arabia was not in support of maintaining the status 
quo in these countries when the waves of the Arab Spring hit them, but in fact the Saudi 
regime backed the opposition in the hope that fall of those regimes will be in Saudi 
Arabia’s interests and will bring new pro-Saudi regimes. Obviously since the Arab 
Spring uprisings reached the region, Saudi Arabia employed its resources to maintain the 
status quo. Saudi Arabia moved its support to its allies, financially bribed its citizens 
through its rentierism policy, and banned revolting against the government. In addition, it 
has brutally repressed any calls for revolt in the Kingdom especially from Shiite minority 
in the Eastern Province and expanded its influence in the region to stop the progress of 
what it defines as an increasing Iranian influence in the region. Saudi Arabia tries to 
achieve these objectives through exerting its political, religious, financial, militarily and 
geographic tools to preserve the status quo internally and most importantly externally. 
Balance of power in the region and Containment as a Saudi Foreign Policy  
Another outcome of the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring is 
balancing the power of contending forces. Initially with the decline in the regional role of 
Egypt in the recent years and Iraq after the 2003 American invasion, Saudi Arabia was 
placed in the position of a major regional power in the region especially in the Gulf 
region that has to confront regional controversies. With the internal strife in Iraq after the 
fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has caused an increasing struggle for leadership in the 
region between Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as a heated extremist sectarian conflict 
between Sunnis and Shiites that increased in the wake of the Arab Spring. Furthermore, 
the overthrow of strong Arab regimes especially in Egypt and the increased probability of 
spillover effect in other Arab countries have further changed the balance of power in the 
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region and has placed Saudi Arabia in a confrontation with more threats that it has to 
balance in order to survive. In addition to the existing competition for regional hegemony 
with Iran, and an increasing regional role of Qatar especially during the Arab Spring was 
another threat to deal with. Furthermore, Neoclassical Realism holds that claim that 
changes in the power indicators in a country have effect on the political, economic and 
ideological interests in another country
126
  With the developments of the Arab Spring, 
Saudi Arabia realizes that the internal changes in some countries affected by the Arab 
Spring such as the rise of political Islam particularly the Muslim Brotherhood is causing a 
threat and must be contained in order to maintain Saudi Arabia's national interests. With 
the Muslim Brotherhood at power in Egypt after the fall of Mubarak’s regime, Saudi 
Arabian influence declined in Egypt due to the alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood with 
Qatar who is seeking a regional role and stood as a financial backer to Egypt under 
Morsi’s regime; which limited the influence of Saudi Arabia in shaping events in Egypt 
through financial support.
127
  Foreign balance of power pursued by Saudi Arabia is to 
guarantee its hegemonic presence in the region through containing the influence of other 
actors that might compromise the Saudi position; this could be achieved through 
increasing the Saudi relative power after evaluating the threats as much as possible to 
secure their security. With the fall of strong regimes in Arab countries that were not 
maintaining friendly relations with Iran; Saudi Arabia realized that Iran perceived such 
development as an opportunity to establish relations with the newly formed governments 
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especially in Egypt under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia has pushed 
for the fall of the Assad’s regime in Syria with aiming to balance the power of Iran, on 
the basis that Iran should lose a powerful ally in the region after Saudi Arabia has lost a 
powerful ally in Egypt which compromised the Sunni axis to confront Iranian influence.  
The balancing policy of Saudi Arabia has been labeled as a policy of containment like 
that of the United States applied to prevent the spread of communism outside the Soviet 
Union back then during the Cold War. Similarly, the Saudi policy of containment was 
employed to prevent the spread of the Iranian influence especially in the Gulf region 
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution as well as containing other threats like the Muslim 
Brotherhood and increasing regional role of Qatar in the region. The balance of power 
represented in the containment policy in Saudi Arabia is characterized by rolling back 
threats instead of appeasement especially towards the threats arising from the Arab 
Spring. The containment policy of Saudi Arabia towards Iran is strongly observed after 
the Kingdom lost its presence and influence in favor of Iran in Syria since the Iraq-Iran 
war, in Iraq since the 2003 invasion and in Gaza under the rule of Hamas. Accordingly, 
Saudi Arabia has developed its foreign policy in response to the perception of the Iranian 
role as an attempt to achieve regional balance of power, through forming a form of 
alliances with friendly countries like Egypt and Jordan which was referred to as the 
“Sunni axis” to confront the “Shiite arc” sponsored by Iran.128 Soon after the outbreak of 
the Arab Spring, this alliance led by Saudi Arabia has collapsed with the fall of the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt.  Such development has caused an increase in the role of Iran 
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the region, especially with the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the parliamentary 
and the presidential elections in Egypt, in addition to the appearance of some 
rapprochement between Egypt and Iran.  Consequently, Saudi Arabia has changed the 
containment from being based on the Sunni axis with Jordan and Egypt amid the Arab 
Spring by relying extensively on the Gulf Cooperation Council to counter the threat of 
Iran. This new alliance has been led by Saudi Arabia to intervene in Bahrain through the 
GCC Peninsula Shield Force to protect the Al Khalifa’s regime and has sponsored the 
GCC initiative to resolve the political crisis in Yemen to transfer power of Abdullah 
Saleh to his vice president Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi which Saudi Arabia supported with 
billions of dollars, fearing the fall of Bahrain and Yemen under the Iranian influence 
sphere. Saudi concerns about the security and stability of its border-country Yemen has 
obliged Saudi Arabia to support a transition of power plan that would not cause a change 
in the balance of power especially with presence of Pro-Iranian militia the Houthis in 
Yemen. Another strategy pursued by Saudi Arabia to its containment policy in balancing 
the power post the Arab Spring was concerned with forming an alliance with all the Arab 
monarchies and attempts to include Jordan and Morocco as members in the GCC, despite 
Morocco and Jordan joining the GCC did not materialize,
129
 Saudi Arabia has called for 
unity between GCC countries to face regional pressures and threats derived from the 
Arab Spring.  
Another foreign balance pursued by Saudi Arabia was with the growing role of Qatar in 
the region amid the Arab Spring, as Qatar role increased especially due to its position is 
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siding with the revolutionary movements in countries outside of the Gulf region, such 
action posed a threat to Saudi Arabia as it will change the balance of power of the region. 
Since Saudi Arabia is mainly pro-status quo which limited the Saudi influence in 
countries that experienced regime changes especially in Egypt and was viewed among the 
Arab population as a counter-revolutionary force. While on the other hand Qatar was 
viewed along with its Al Jazeera channel as a supporter for revolutions which placed 
Qatar at odds with Saudi Arabia who favored the status quo.
130
 Qatari support to 
revolutionary waves especially to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has posed a 
challenge to Saudi Arabia, since Saudi leaders realize that changes in the internal politics 
of a country like Egypt could lead to a change in the political balance in Saudi Arabia or 
other countries, which will be weakening the Saudi position regionally and might 
threaten the existence of the Al Saud’s regime internally. For Saudi Arabia, the Muslim 
Brotherhood offer an alternative to the Saudi Wahhabi monarchy as an opposing 
revolutionary Sunni doctrine which is also witnessed a rapprochement with Iran when 
were in power. In addition, the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood differs in strategy 
from the Wahhabi ideology as the Muslim Brotherhood has shown ability to penetrate 
and transform foreign and western values for their favor and modifying their rhetoric to 
suit their addressees to achieve fundamental ultimate goals.
131
 Thus, Saudi Arabia founds 
it necessary to balance the power of Qatar on the regional level and contain the rising 
power of the Muslim Brotherhood. As soon as the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood 
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regime occurred in July 2013, Saudi Arabia was the first to support the military backed 
government in Egypt and offered billion of dollars in financial support. Saudi Arabia 
further contained the presence of Qatar, which is clearly evident in the case of the Saudi 
alignment inside the GCC especially with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain who 
withdrew their ambassadors as the conflict between them and Qatar developed over the 
Qatari position towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Saudi Arabia has managed to 
formulate its foreign policy amid the threats posed by the Arab Spring based on balancing 
the powers through the use of containment policy towards perceived threats of increasing 
Iranian influence, rising regional role of Qatar and containing the rise of Muslim 
Brotherhood. This policy has proved effective in countries like Egypt, Bahrain and in the 
shorter term in Yemen despite that it has currently collapsed, where the pro-Iranian group 
of Houthis took control of the country and forced the pro-Saudi government of Abd 
Rabbu Mansour Hadi to step down in January 2015.
132
 
Power and opportunity 
Saudi Arabia's foreign policy is also characterized by the concept of power and 
opportunity towards the Arab Spring, the concept refers simply to attempts taken by 
countries to seize the opportunities arising from the changes in the systemic level to 
increase their relative power. Power and opportunity in the case of Saudi Arabia refers to 
the attempts by Saudi Arabia to gain grounds in countries that was not in good relations 
with Saudi Arabia and that the Arab Spring offered an opportunity to change this relation 
most notably in Syria and Libya. Starting with the conflict in Libya in early 2011, Saudi 
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Arabia was still shocked by the removal of its strong ally Hosni Mubarak from power in 
Egypt, yet Saudi leaders have seen the wave of protests in Libya as an opportunity to 
increase their presence in a period fraught with turmoil in countries that were not on good 
relations with the Kingdom. The Qaddafi’s regime was a strong antagonist to the Al 
Saud’s regime and has criticized Saudi Arabia to the extent of saying that Saudi Arabia 
should be divided into small republics,
133
 so when the protests were calling for the 
overthrow of Qaddafi’s regime, Saudi Arabia did not pursue its policy of maintaining the 
status quo and protecting the stability of current regime in Libya. On the contrary, Saudi 
Arabia initiated and backed the Arab League resolution to impose a no fly zone in Libya 
and the NATO intervention that led to the fall of Qaddafi’s regime. Saudi Arabia saw in 
the uprisings a challenge to regional stability but also an opportunity to increase its power 
and take down its enemies. Soon after the fall of Qaddafi’s regime, Saudi Arabia has 
taken initiatives to strengthen ties with Libya as a step to gain support in a country was 
far from having good relationship with Saudi Arabia under the Qaddafi’s regime through 
encouraging Saudi investors to invest in Libya.
134
 However, Saudi Arabia is currently 
being cautious in giving strong support or taking an explicit side in Libya to a specific 
faction, as the unstable situation continues in the country due to the civil war and the 
emergence of many forces with varying degrees of power makes. Such unstable 
circumstances make the situation unpredictable about ending the conflict in favor of 
which faction in controlling the country, in addition that Libya in not strategically 
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important to Saudi Arabia when compared to other countries that experienced regime 
change such as Egypt, which explains the Saudi position in not strongly promoting the 
Saudi influence in post-Qaddafi Libya.  
In Syria, Saudi Arabia saw it also an opportunity in the Syrian Arab Spring to increase its 
power in the region and to eliminate an old rival like Syria Assad’s regime, where Saudi 
leaders consider Syria as the only Arab ally to Iran since the Iran-Iraq war and the Syrian 
role in the assassination of Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri. Saudi Arabia realized 
that Syria under Assad’s regime is moving away from the Arabs and in moving more 
towards the Iranian sphere of influence.
135
 Saudi Arabia recognizes that if the Assad’s 
regime falls and is replaced by a friendly regime this will give Saudi Arabia more 
influence especially in Iraq and Lebanon and reinstate a better “regional balance of 
power”.136 With the increased calls from the Syrian opposition to the step down of 
Assad’s regime, Saudi Arabia immediately supported the opposition and as the clash 
developed into an armed conflict; Saudi Arabia financially, militarily and diplomatically 
supported the opposition, while on the other hand Iran supported the Syrian regime which 
turned the situation in Syria into a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia has called for arming the Syrian opposition, pushed for sanctions and asked for 
international military intervention several times to oust Assad’s regime and accused the 
Syrian regime for using chemical weapons against the Syrian people.
137
 Saudi Arabia 
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took advantage that Hezbollah took side with Assad’s regime and considered it an 
opportunity to undermine Hezbollah’s legitimacy that increased in the Arab World after 
the 2006 Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, where Hezbollah was seen as a true resisting 
power against Israel. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s clerics has called for jihad against 
Hezbollah militias in Syria and accusing them of killing their fellow Sunni Syrians.
138
  
Generally, Saudi Arabia saw the Arab Spring in Libya and Syria as an opportunity to 
increase its power and influence in the region rather than a challenge to regional stability, 
and thus has disregarded their policy of preservation of status quo. The Saudi leaders are 
trying to capitalize on the opportunities made available by the Arab Spring in ousting 
rival regimes of Qaddafi and Assad, which their presence has not only comprised the 
Saudi role in the region but also enhanced the influence of Iran at the expense of the 
Saudi presence.   
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion 
The Arab Spring that erupted in early 2011 represents a milestone to the security of the 
region. Saudi Arabia among many other countries was faced with many threats and has 
formulated a set of policies towards the events of the Arab Spring.  The thesis “The Saudi 
reaction to the Arab Revolts: The Paradoxical Saudi Policy towards the Arab Spring” 
offered an explanation of the reactions of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring which 
seems contradictory, due to the different positions taken by the Kingdom from supporting 
the regimes in countries like Egypt and Bahrain; while supporting and in some cases 
funding the opposition against the regime most notably in Libya and Syria. 
The discussion showed that some of the prevailing theories of international relations to be 
inadequate in analyzing the topic at hand. For Classical Realism, the theory focuses the 
nature of human kind in the anarchic international system, while Neo-realism as a system 
level theory focuses only the foreign policy of a specific state is based on structural 
factors external to the state and ignores the role of internal factors in the formation of 
foreign policy behavior. Liberalism on the other hand, as a unit level theory emphasizes 
on the role of domestic variables and discounts the role of external power balance in the 
international arena. The thesis introduces Neoclassical Realism as a framework to explain 
the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring through its focus on the effect 
of internal factors within the state as intervening variables that contribute to the formation 
of foreign policy behavior. The thesis presents the intervening variables as the Saudi 
perception of the threats imposed by the Arab Spring and the internal capabilities that 
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Saudi Arabia has at its disposal that help in formulating the foreign policy of Saudi 
Arabia towards the Arab Spring. 
The perception of the threats resulting from the Arab Spring and how Saudi Arabia dealt 
with these threats using its capabilities proves that the Kingdom pursues a foreign policy 
centered on national interests and particularly security. Saudi foreign policy has been 
evolving around regime and state security, preservation of Saudi regional hegemony 
especially in the Gulf, and the protection of regional stability. Neoclassical Realists 
believe that systemic pressures force the state to increase its power to eventually 
guarantee its security. This is clear in the foreign policy behavior of Saudi Arabia that has 
three main characteristics. Firstly the preservation of the status quo in the region which 
will ensure the hegemonic position of Saudi Arabia over other countries and ensure the 
stability of regimes that maintains friendly relations with the Kingdom, since any change 
in the existing regional balance will comprise the stability and survival of the Kingdom. 
Secondly, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is characterized by balancing the power of 
contending states, most importantly Iran and containing its influence throughout the 
region, in addition to balancing other rising powers, such as Qatar, that might affect the 
existing regional balance of power. Finally, the power and opportunity aspects where 
Saudi Arabia saw in the Arab Spring a chance to increase its relative power and seize 
opportunities in countries where the Kingdom had no or minimal influence and maintains 
poor relations with them such as in Syria and Libya. 
Back to the research questions raised in this study, the first research question about how a 
conservative status quo power like Saudi Arabia served its objectives in a revolutionary 
environment. This research question is examined mainly through discussing the 
105 
 
capabilities that Saudi Arabia has at its disposal and how it mobilized these resources to 
serve its objectives. Saudi Arabia uses a combination of military, religious, economic and 
geographic capabilities to formulate its foreign policy towards the Arab Spring which 
proved effective. To sum up, Saudi Arabia has used the rentierism strategy internally, 
offered financial support to other countries to influence events there and used its religious 
significance to protect its national interests through the Islamic fatwa banning revolting 
against the rulers and describing protests as un-Islamic. Saudi Arabia was also able to 
mobilize its geographic importance to lead the Gulf countries and attempting to create a 
union with all Arab monarchies. The military capability of Saudi Arabia also witnessed 
effective mobilization and no signs disagreement between the ruling family and different 
military institutions since the military are highly controlled by members of the ruling 
family. In short, Saudi Arabia successfully achieved its objectives in the revolutionary 
environment imposed by the Arab Spring.  Saudi Arabia was able to protect its interests 
and guarantee its security through the diverse capabilities that the Kingdom has and was 
effectively able to mobilize them for favor of its national interests. 
The second research question speculates the contradictory standards that Saudi Arabia 
has towards the Arab Spring. This question is answered in this thesis through explaining 
the threats resulting from the Arab Spring and how they were perceived by Saudi Arabia. 
The positions taken by Saudi Arabia towards these threats whether they are concerned 
with the increase in Iranian influence in the region, the rise of Muslim Brotherhood 
especially in Egypt, the regional competition with Qatar or domestic unrest in Saudi 
Arabia indicate the Saudi pursue for national interests including their security, stability, 
survival and regional balance of power. Saudi Arabia is perceiving these changes 
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resulting from the Arab Spring as threats mainly as they negatively affect; and 
compromise the regional role and hegemonic power of Saudi Arabia and threaten the 
survival of the Al Saud’s regime that draw legitimacy mainly from religious and 
economic factors. Therefore, the contradictory reactions towards the Arab Spring either 
in supporting the ruling regimes in Egypt, Bahrain and Yemen or supporting the 
opposition in Libya and Syria is based on the Saudi national interests in maintaining the 
rule of Al Saud and to eliminate any threat that challenge the legitimacy of the Al Saud’s 
regime and the security of Saudi Arabia, regardless this will place the Kingdom in the 
pro-revolutions or anti-revolutions positions. Saudi Arabia applies a foreign policy of 
balancing the power of Iran, Qatar and Egypt under the rule of Muslim Brotherhood. For 
Iran, Saudi Arabia perceived the Arab Spring as in increase in the Iranian Influence in 
countries like Yemen and Bahrain and that any regime change in these countries will 
compromise the security of Saudi Arabia and fall in the Iranian sphere of influence. 
Accordingly, Saudi Arabia intervened militarily in Bahrain and sponsored a plan to 
transfer power in Yemen to avoid increased Iranian influence or a regime change that will 
end up in favor of Iran. In Syria, Saudi Arabia saw in the revolts against the Assad’s 
regime as an opportunity to get rid of a regime loyal to Iran which is embodied in the 
Saudi support to the opposition against the Assad’s regime. Saudi Arabia saw also in the 
increasing role of Qatar during the Arab Spring and the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt as a threat to its security since Muslim Brotherhood ideology is seen as a more 
accommodating Sunni ideology that could replace the Saudi Wahhabi ideology from 
which the Al Saud monarchial regime derives its legitimacy. Furthermore, the ambitions 
of Qatar for a regional role and presenting itself as the supporter to Arab revolutions and 
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their support to the Muslim Brotherhood is threatening the security of Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi Arabia strongly backed the overthrew of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt and 
backed the new regimes post Morsi, and due to the continues Qatari support to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia along with other GCC countries withdrew their 
ambassadors from Qatar as an objection for the Qatari support to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and interference in the internal affairs of other GCC member countries. 
The different positions taken by Saudi Arabia towards the events Arab Spring is what 
makes the Saudi foreign policy seem inconsistent. This leads us to the first hypothesis 
presented in this study that the Saudi policy towards Arab Spring is highly consistent 
regardless of the apparent inconsistency which is accepted. Since the contradictions in the 
Saudi actions towards the Arab Spring is different from the consistency of the Saudi 
foreign policy. The foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is consistent focusing on national 
interests that are unchanged even before the Arab Spring, since the Iranian Revolution in 
1979 and Saudi Arabia perceive the Islamic Republic of Iran as a threat to its security and 
has formulated its foreign policy since then to balance the power of Iran and contain its 
influence in the region.  The position towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or 
regional competition with Qatar is also unchanged in terms of the foreign policy of Saudi 
Arabia as whenever the Kingdom is challenged by a state or a contending actor that 
might compromise the legitimacy, stability and security of Saudi Arabia; historically, 
Saudi Arabia has opposed any rising power or ideology like Nasserism and Baathism. 
Generally, the Kingdom formulates its foreign policy to secure its national interests 
regardless whether this pursue of national interests is translated in consistent or 
inconsistent actions toward different issues.  
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Second hypothesis about that the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia experiences a pivotal 
shift as a result of the Arab Spring, where Saudi policy is showing more assertiveness and 
a risk prone tendency is accepted. Despite that historically Saudi Arabia has taken some 
positions that are characterized as having a risk prone tendency for instance, the decision 
that Saudi Arabia took within the OAPEC to impose an oil embargo in 1973 on several 
countries including a superpower such as the United States as a response to their support 
to Israel in the October War of 1973 shows a risk prone decision at the time of 
international congestion. However, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab 
Spring has more risk prone tendency. Generally, the Arab Spring has limited the capacity 
of major western global powers, especially the United States, to intervene on the regime 
in countries experiencing revolts, since such intervention would be seen against the 
western values of supporting democratic values and peaceful calls of reform especially in 
the Gulf where there is a glaring gap between American values and interests. Such 
development has given Saudi Arabia as a regional power greater maneuverability 
conducting their foreign policy through intervening militarily in Bahrain to protect Al 
Khalifa’s regime against Shiite uprisings that might turn into the favor of Iran, 
orchestrating a transition plan in Yemen to transfer powers, taking strong position against 
the Syrian regime and launching containment policy against Iran throughout the region. 
The risk prone tendency has been obvious also in the documents used for the content 
analysis where there are tangible changes in the post Arab Spring documents including 
clear keywords like confirmation on the Gulf stability as a part of the Saudi stability, 
protection of Arab security and stability against foreign intervention, asking for union 
instead of cooperation between GCC countries, asking for international intervention in 
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Syria, commenting on the domestic affairs of other countries and proposed transition of 
power initiatives to Yemen and Syria. While documents before the Arab Spring focused 
on Arab solidarity, counter terrorism, fighting poverty and asking national unity in Iraq 
and Iran. Such risk prone tendency in conducting the Saudi foreign policy post the Arab 
Spring is high correlated with such systemic event like the Arab Spring that has forced 
the Kingdom to take an explicit leading role in regional controversies especially with the 
fall of strong Arab regimes such as in Egypt and Tunisia. The content analysis shows 
significance increase in actions taken when compared with the time frame chosen. The 
results in chart 4 show that the documents published before the Arab Spring (from 2008 
to 2010) were more rhetorical in nature with a percentage of 58.4 % and action oriented 
of 41.6%, while after the Arab Spring (from 2011 to 2014) documents including 
rhetorical content were 9.9% and action oriented content were 90.1%.  This results shows 
that foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring is more action oriented with 
a strong dependence between the variables according to Chi-Square with a value of 
52.850 as shown in table 5. These results further prove the hypothesis that the Saudi 
policy is showing more assertiveness and a risk prone tendency as a result of the Arab 
Spring. 
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Chart 4- Mood (before and after the Arab Spring) 
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Table 5- Chi-Square measurement for mood (before and after the Arab Spring) 
The final hypothesis raised in this thesis claiming that the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
is formed by hard core security and political interests rather than religious motives is 
accepted. It is obvious that the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia as aforementioned is 
mainly concerned with the struggle to protect national interests and most importantly its 
security interest in the preservation of status quo particularly in the Arabian Gulf and in 
countries where the regimes are loyal to Saudi Arabia. Saudi national interests are also 
concerned with its own regime survival and stability within the Kingdom so whenever a 
threat emerge either internally or externally, Saudi Arabia backed by its capabilities 
formulate set of policies to ensure the achievement and the protection of its national 
interests. The foreign policy despite supporting the Sunni Muslims in countries 
experiencing sectarian conflict with Shiite communities such in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; 
yet the conflict in the first place is with the Iranian influence in the region rather than a 
sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shiite Islam which asserts that the motives of Saudi 
foreign policy are driven by pure security and political interest rather than religious. 
However, the sectarian card has been used heavily by Saudi Arabia to justify their actions 
either towards internal problems in the Kingdom like oppressing the Shiite protests in the 
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Eastern Province or externally in other countries like justifying the military intervention 
in Bahrain on the regime’s side.  
Finally, the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia towards the Arab Spring has several factors 
contributing to its formulation. This thesis tried to include all possible aspects available to 
examine and offer a comprehensive analysis of the Saudi foreign policy towards the Arab 
Spring through using Neoclassical Realism as an approach to break down and explain the 
topic at hand. Since the theory is considered to be the most suitable approach to analyze 
the phenomena of the Arab Spring away from other approaches that might ignore 
important aspects, like for instance the role of internal factors in determining the foreign 
policy behavior of states.   
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Annex-Content Analysis 
Introduction: 
The content analysis applied in this thesis aims to offer a systematic and objective 
measurement to identify trends over a period of time. Content analysis is applied to 
statements, speeches and declarations by Saudi officials over the period from 2008 to 
2014.  The time period chose is a span of 8 years to study and compare changes in the 
foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 4 years before the events of the Arab Spring and 4 years 
after, this part offers the study design, method  the major findings. 
Population:  
The population of the content analysis is concerned with two dimensions which are the 
topic area and the time period. The population of the content analysis applied for this 
thesis is the official statements by the King and other senior officials in the Saudi 
ministry of foreign affairs since the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia is hierarchical and 
formulated at the top levels of the ruling elites. Thus, the most reliable and credible 
materials that could be used to interpret the changes in the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia 
should be concerned with the statements, speeches and press conferences made either the 
King or other Saudi officials within the body of the Saudi ministry of foreign affairs. 
Sample: 
Based on the defined population, the sample was selected of statements, speeches, press 
conferences, and other documents published on the online website of the ministry of 
foreign affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that were largely made by the King, 
Saudi foreign minister and other Saudi officials within a specific period of time which is 
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from 2008 to 2014, or four years before the eruption of the events of the Arab Spring and 
four years after. The data was derived from the materials published of the official website 
of the ministry of foreign of affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, since it is the most 
reliable and trusted source to get such data and is not influenced by opinions and political 
backgrounds whether in favor or against the regime and Saudi Arabia and it contains the 
official position of Saudi Arabia towards different events. After implementing the content 
analysis on the selected sample with validating and removing some materials that does 
not fit the study; for instance, one document was about a lecture by a professor at the 
ministry of foreign affairs. The sample includes 53 materials that were examined and 
studied to come up with the results of the study. Essentially the sample included 57 
documents however after eliminating irrelevant documents, the actual numbers of 
documents included in the content analysis were 53 documents that the data was derived 
and interpreted from. The documents were ranging from press releases, speeches and 
statements issued in different events like meetings, summit and conferences by several 
Saudi officials. 
Method: 
Since this thesis will not be solely dependent on the data derived from the content 
analysis, the content analysis was designed to offer investigation to some factors that are 
important to this thesis and will be enough to produce the required results. The categories 
used for the content analysis were as follows: date, countries mentioned, speaker, place, 
speaker’s tone, does it offer an explanation or just a position, mood whether it is action 
oriented or rhetorical and the size of document. The categories selected are not all with 
the same significance and might not be all useful to examine the topic at hand yet they 
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offer the reader a better understanding on the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia about 
different issues. This study recorded and categorized themes either some simple 
categories to measure and interpret data qualitatively to be used in this thesis or to be 
used as references to support a specific claim in the thesis. 
The study examined the documents on the Ministry of foreign affairs in Arabic 
language to have a better conceptualization of the documents put under analysis. The 
content analysis was conducted by two different coders, the author of this study and 
another independent coder in order to increase the credibility of this study. In the end 
when each coder came up with the results individually to avoid being affected by 
each other and were ultimately matched against each other. In addition, disagreement 
between the coders was presented to each category with conflicting views.  In 
reaching intercoder agreement and reliability, comparison were made between 
myself and the other coder to reach a decision on any conflicting decision concerned 
with the creating the categories or with filling the data. Generally, the data generated 
in the study were all agreed upon by the coders with exception to speaker’s tone and 
the status of the document (if it offers an explanation or just a political position) 
categories, in addition to some minor disagreement in actions category. The below 
table offers the percentage of agreement for each category used for the content 
analysis.  
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Table 6- Intercoder Agreement   
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Abbreviations 
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council 
UAE: United Arab Emirates 
G-20: The Group of Twenty of major economies 
OAPEC: Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
SCAF: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
IS: Islamic State 
UNCCT: United Nations Centre for Counter Terrorism 
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